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iAbstract
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the writing of Michel Foucault within political 
theory.  This  paper  will  examine  two  series  of  lectures  Foucault  presented  at  the  Collège  de 
France in which he discussed in detail  a  cluster of  subjects with clear political connotations. 
Within the 1978 and 1979 series Foucault outlined the concept of governmentality, which he 
divided into two subcategories: the police-state and liberalism. 
He also considered socialism’s relationship to governmentality.  In this instance, however, he 
argued  that  socialism  had  yet  to  produce  an  autonomous  governmentality:  meaning  that  it 
could not exist as an autonomous political entity,  only serving as an appendage to liberal or 
authoritarian regimes.
The fundamental interest of  this discussion is to determine if  socialist thought has advanced 
since Foucault offered his assessment. It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the entire 
span of socialist literature produced since the 1970s; rather this paper will focus on the work of 
Antonio  Negri  and  Micheal  Hardt,  who  represent  a  particularly  important  strand  in 
contemporary socialist thought.
Few  publications  on  Marxist  theory  have  generated  as  much  debate  over  the  last  decade  as 
Empire.  Through  Empire  and  its  follow-up  Multitude,  Hardt  and  Negri  developed  an 
innovative political philosophy that draws on Marx and other major thinkers in the Western 
tradition,  such as  Spinoza.  The centre-piece of  their  philosophy is  the  concept  of  multitude. 
Multitude is the alternative political model Hardt and Negri propose to the current dominant 
system, which they refer to as empire. Empire exploits the labour of people across the world 
and reifies  national identities and conflicts.  Whereas multitude is  a  system derived from the 
cumulative  labour  of  the  world’s  people  and  seeks  to  resolve  any  conflict  that  emerges  as  a 
consequence  of  identity  politics,  thereby  re-affirming  today’s  marginalised  identities  and 
enabling new political identities to form.
In comparing Foucault’s analysis on governmentality with the theory of multitude this paper 
seeks  to  determine  if  Hardt  and  Negri  have  developed  an  autonomous  socialist 
governmentality.  The  conclusion  drawn  is  that  they  have  not  proposed  such  a 
governmentality. In fact it is possible that a political system may appear to exhibit features of 
multitude  but,  at  the  same  time,  may  adopt  neo-liberal  practices.  Hence,  multitude  cannot 
entirely displace neo-liberalism.
However, that is not to say the concept of multitude is without merit. For instance, it offers a 
method of  establishing novel  identities and communities,  thereby protecting the diversity of 
cultures across the world. For those reasons multitude constitutes a qualitative step forward in 
an increasingly globalised political economy.
! !
Introduction 
In 1979 Michel Foucault delivered “The Birth of Biopolitics” lectures at the Collège 
de France. Despite the title, the lectures largely focused on the subject of 
governmentality. Governmentality is a complex notion. It develops concepts 
Foucault had previously explored in his writing on discipline, revealing the wider 
political context in which discipline exists. Governmentality supersedes discipline 
because governmentality constitutes an entire system of knowledge. It enables the 
generation of various institutions and practices (technologies of power), among 
which discipline exists as one (Lemke 2000). Hence, governmentality should be 
thought of as a process encompassing both an ideological component (knowledge) 
and a practical component (power). For instance the liberal governmentality has the 
ideological imperative to reduce the scope of the state. In practice, however, a 
market economy requires significant legislation to operate smoothly, as well as an 
agent (in the form of the state) capable of enforcing rules. 
This paper will focus on socialism's relationship to governmentality: a relationship 
that Foucault made some compelling, albeit oblique, references to within the 1979 
series. Essentially, Foucault argued that socialism had yet to develop an 
autonomous governmentality. This puts socialism in contrast to the police-state and 
liberalism, which Foucault characterised as the two principal forms of 
governmentality. For Foucault, although socialism possessed a robust ideology, it 
lacked an autonomous governmentality because it lacked the practical capacity to 
generate unique institutions. Until socialism could establish such institutions, it was 
Foucault's belief that it would operate either as a checking mechanism within liberal 
governments or as a purely ideological imperative within authoritarian systems. 
That is not to say Foucault's analysis precludes the possibility of a socialist 
governmentality emerging at some point. Governmentality is a process not an 
immutable concept: it has evolved significantly over time. Indeed, the possibility of 
new governmentalities appearing is confirmed by Foucault's discussion on neo-
liberalism. Neo-liberalism departs in so many respects from the classic liberal 
tradition that it can be categorised as a third governmentality.  
In the years since Foucault delivered the lectures, socialist theory has developed 
significantly, which may point towards a possible emergence of a socialist 
governmentality. This paper will focus on one particular strand of contemporary 
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socialist thought: the concept of multitude, proposed by Antonio Negri and Michael 
Hardt. Although Hardt and Negri have not commented on governmentality explicitly 
in their work, it is nevertheless argued here that Hardt and Negri have, through 
multitude, developed a rationale that could form the basis for a socialist 
governmentality.   
That does not mean multitude is at present a governmentality, nor is it entirely 
certain that it will become a governmentality. For that to happen, it must fulfill the 
two aspects of the power/knowledge relationship. That is to say, multitude must not 
only constitute an ideology, but it must possess a practical element that could 
promote the development of unique political institutions. Clearly multitude has the 
ideological component of the power/knowledge relationship. However, since 
multitude has never been enacted in practice, it is not clear if it would offer a 
genuine alternative to the police-state, liberalism or neo-liberalism. 
Hardt and Negri would almost certainly dispute the assertion that multitude could 
become a form of governmentality. They would most likely associate 
governmentality with empire. Nevertheless, this paper argues that multitude could 
become a governmentality because it shares a feature common to all forms of 
governmentality: that political structures must emerge from economic rationales. 
The political systems the police and liberal governmentalities generate are 
underpinned by a rationale that holds political stability is achieved through the 
balancing of economic forces. An economic rationale also informs multitude, 
although it is a different interpretation of the nature of "the economy" than that of 
the police and liberal modes. Hardt and Negri fall within a Marxist tradition that 
regards established notions of the economy as too abstract. According to this 
school, the only real economic factor is labour. The theory of multitude advances 
this reading of the economy further by deriving an entire political system from 
labour. Hardt and Negri have argued that the only just political system is one 
capable of harnessing the cumulative labour of all people across the world.  
Hence, although the theory of multitude diverges from the police and liberal 
governmentalities in its interpretation of the nature of the economy, it can still be 
said that the theory of multitude is informed by an economic rationale. Within the 
theory of multitude, like the police and liberal governmentalities, political structures 
emerge from essentially non-political, economic, sources. Multitude differs only in 
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the respect that this theory holds there is just one source of value within the 
economy, as opposed to a range of sources. Hence, like all forms of 
governmentality, multitude emerges from an economic ideology rather than a purely 
political rationale. For instance, attaching certain rights to citizenship.   
The connection between multitude and governmentality has both a positive and 
negative aspect. Beginning with the negative side, it is possible that the most recent 
form of governmentality to emerge, neo-liberalism, may ultimately usurp multitude.  
Admittedly there may not appear to be an obvious connection between neo-
liberalism and multitude. However, this is precisely why Foucault's lectures are of 
such interest in relation to the theory of multitude.  
Foucault's account indicates that there may be an opening that could lead to the 
emergence of neo-liberal practices in a political system governed under the ideology 
of multitude. This opening is the result of an overlap between multitude and certain 
characteristics that Foucault associates with neo-liberalism, such as the breakdown 
of conventional national sovereignty. Further, given that Hardt and Negri have not 
provided a clear plan of how multitude would operate in practice, there is a great 
deal of ambiguity regarding how political institutions could adequately embody the 
theory of multitude. Therefore, even if a political system operated according to the 
principles of multitude, this would not necessarily exclude the emergence of neo-
liberal practices. If this were the case, the theory Hardt and Negri have proposed is 
merely a contemporary revival of the socialist theory Foucault criticized in the 
lectures. Under this scenario, the possibility of the emergence of an autonomous 
socialist governmentality would appear as remote as ever. 
Having said that, it has been suggested there is a critical strategy, capable of 
countering the dominant forms of governmentality, underlying the lectures (Lemke 
2000). Lemke focused on how to effectively critique neo-liberalism. After closely 
scrutinizing the strategy he proposed, it becomes apparent that there are a number 
of gaps within the theory of multitude through which neo-liberal practice could 
entrench itself.  
Foucault did not himself articulate within the lectures the strategy Lemke has 
proposed. However, it is argued here that this critical strategy is compatible with 
texts in which Foucault commented more explicitly on approaches to initiating 
political change (most notably, What is Enlightenment?(Foucault 1991)).  
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Lemke believed that the majority of critiques on neo-liberalism have been beset by a 
fundamental failure in method. He noted that often these analyses are characterized 
by a tendency to dismiss neo-liberalism too quickly, and subsequently to make 
grand, but ultimately unfounded, claims for alternative “liberating” systems. Lemke 
argued that these two factors result in such commentaries, counter-intuitively, 
reemphasizing the structural flaws that led to the creation of the problems 
associated with neo-liberalism in the first place. Hence he called for:  
"[A] ‘strategical’ conception of theory [that] prevent[s] us from a very serious 
flaw that dominates much contemporary critique: the “essentialisation of the 
critique of essentialism”. What do I mean by this? When social and political 
scientists increasingly claim the importance of categories like “invention”, 
“fiction” and “construction” for their work, they often double the theoretical 
attitude they initially set out to criticise: By firmly believing the 
“poststructualist” or “anti-essentialist” stance they adopt does signal a 
“right” or “true” knowledge, they actually take up a theoretical position, 
Foucault once criticized as “juridico-political discourse”." (Lemke 2000, 14) 
Based on Lemke's analysis, this paper will argue that the openings for neo-liberal 
practice within multitude are the result of a flaw in the critical method utilized by 
Hardt and Negri. Hardt and Negri, like the critics of neo-liberalism Lemke targeted, 
believe that in multitude they have found a truly just political system. Hence they 
have fallen into the "juridico-political" trap by developing a binary distinction 
between multitude and empire. 
Having said that, there is still reason to be positive. 
First because Lemke's analysis indicates that if there is a problem with the critical 
strategy presented in Empire and Multitude, then it is a matter of altering that 
strategy to salvage the concept of multitude. 
Indeed, there are passages of Empire that examine explicitly the limitations of 
simple formulae on political liberation. Hardt and Negri acknowledge that traditional 
Marxist dialectics have frequently led socialist authors to adopt the critical approach 
Lemke decried against. They argue that multitude has by-passed this problem by 
offering a truly expansive concept based on the political philosophy of Spinoza, 
specifically his analysis on immanence and transcendence. Evaluating whether 
Hardt and Negri have been successful in moving beyond simple dialectics is a 
crucial goal of this text. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that multitude will be 
subsumed by neo-liberalism. Although Hardt and Negri do not explicitly 
acknowledge Foucault's analysis on the shortcomings of the socialist critical 
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tradition, aspects of Empire appear to have intuitively responded to Foucault's 
argument. Since multitude does not yet exist, it is impossible to say that it will avoid 
or fall victim to the fate Foucault associates with previous socialist critiques. 
Ultimately then, this paper is more concerned with highlighting potential pitfalls for 
the application of multitude, than presenting a specific proposal for how multitude 
should be implemented.  
However, assuming that multitude could become an autonomous socialist 
governmentality, there is yet an even greater question. That is to say if it is desirable 
to base modern politics on governmentality in the first place. Although Hardt and 
Negri may make certain advancements beyond traditions that derive their economic 
model from capitalist modes, a significant problem in modern politics may be the 
reliance on economic structures to derive political forms. There may yet be some 
superior concept of modern politics outside governmentality. 
This paper will avoid directly answering this question for two reasons. First, because 
the subject of the paper is governmentality and socialism, not alternatives to 
governmentality. The second reason ties back to Lemke's reading on the flaws of 
conventional critiques on neo-liberalism. 
The wider point that emerges from Lemke's account is that there is a danger in 
establishing a "liberated" politics by simply opposing a new just system against the 
deficiencies in an older rival form. His analysis indicates that an attempt to dismiss 
governmentality out of hand may in fact not resolve the core imperfections of 
governmental systems. 
This aspect of Lemke's account reveals a point of conflict in method between the 
theory Hardt and Negri propose and that of Foucault. In What is Enlightenment? 
Foucault noted that attempts to radically redefine politics in the twentieth century, 
most notably fascism and Soviet communism, in the end produced horrors on a 
previously unknown scale. In contrast, smaller scale, more targeted, attempts to 
expand and re-orientate established political structures, for instance to breakdown 
gender barriers and include minority groups, had achieved far greater success 
despite their more limited goals.  
Having said that, it is still important to raise the question of whether governmentality 
is desirable. A vital component of the critical strategy Foucault proposed in What is 
Enlightenment? is that everyone, individually and collectively, should have an ethical 
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obligation to engage in a perpetual critique of established ideas and practices. 
There may be a superior system to governmentality, and this is important to keep in 
mind when defining more reasonable goals. 
Hence, it will be argued that governmentality is the necessary paradigm through 
which politics must work today, even if this is not ideal. The position taken here is 
that for all the flaws of the modern forms of governmentality, they nevertheless offer 
superior notions of politics than previous non-governmental systems. The positive 
aspect of multitude's connection with governmentality then is that multitude through 
governmentality may have the ability to bring communities and individuals 
traditionally excluded from politics into political life. For instance, a positive way to 
read the narrative Foucault presented on governmentality in the lectures would be to 
see it as an account of the gradual descent of politics from the exclusive terrain of 
monarchs to individuals across society. Multitude takes this strand of 
governmentality further, offering the potential for a truly inclusive global society. 
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1 The Theory of Governmentality 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the core features of governmentality. This 
will provide the context in which to determine if Hardt and Negri have developed an 
autonomous socialist governmentality. 
Within the lectures, Foucault proposed two basic forms of governmentality: the 
police state and liberalism. More recently, neo-liberalism emerged as a third form. 
Passages of the lectures indicate that socialism may have characteristics of 
governmentality, but on the whole Foucault’s account suggests it does not yet 
constitute a forth form of governmentality1. Establishing if the socialist theory Hardt 
and Negri propose constitutes a socialist governmentality is the subject of this 
paper. 
A continuum of authoritarianism connects the principal forms; with liberalism 
granting citizens many freedoms under a rule of law system, and the police state 
largely restricting freedom. Foucault’s account indicates that in not developing a 
unique governmentality, socialism has not found a defined space on this scale 
meaning that it has functioned as either a checking mechanism within liberal 
systems or as a guiding philosophy in socialist systems. Obviously this situation 
runs contrary to the intentions behind socialist theory; hence it is an important 
exercise to determine if Hardt and Negri have taken socialist theory a step beyond 
Foucault’s summation of it in the late 1970’s2. 
1.1 Governmentality 
Governmentality is the major topic of the 1978 and 1979 lecture series. With the 
term governmentality, Foucault refers to a series of the techniques and procedures 
through which individuals and populations, at all levels of society and state, can be 
governed, organized and administered. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 C.f. in particular the lecture delivered on 31 January 1979 (Foucault 2008). 
2 This account on governmentality will largely concentrate on the implications of Foucault’s 
analysis for political institutions; with the exception of the paper’s final section, which 
examines possibilities for initiating political change, given the complexities of modern 
political systems. For a more detailed account of the implications of governmentality for 
subjectivity and the ethics of the self consult Dean 1996. Dean characterises Foucault’s work 
on governmentality as, “a critical, historical and political ontology of ourselves and our 
present.” (Dean 1996, 209). 
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Foucault's account indicates that it has existed in some form for a considerable 
amount of time.  The history of governmentality begins proper in the medieval era, 
however, Foucault even found aspects of it in Ancient Greek culture3. 
In the medieval period, the concept of government was associated with religious 
practice and household management. For instance, the father of the household was 
considered responsible for its government. He was charged with its economic 
management as well as the moral development of its inhabitants. In the realm of 
religious practice, government was attributed to the Pastor, whose role it was to 
guide the spiritual development of his community.  
However, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a combination of a political 
revolution prompted by the Reformation, and a re-assessment of the nature of 
politics in intellectual discourse, expanded the concept of government out from the 
spiritual and domestic to the domain of politics. Increasingly it was felt that the 
monarch bore a responsibility to govern his whole people in the same manner in 
which the father governed his household and Pastor governed his local community. 
Hence a chain of government was established from the home, to the community to 
the country.  
It is at this point that the first elements of the police governmentality emerged, which 
also provided the basis for the eventual development of the liberal governmentality.  
Although both forms are distinct, there is some overlap between their rationales and 
the structures each has generated. For instance both assume the presence of the 
state, that the state will exist within a network of states and that the state has a 
responsibility to manage its population.  
Foucault proposed specific definitions for these common features, which differ from 
the colloquial use of these terms. For instance, Foucault does not treat the state as 
necessarily being synonymous with the nation. Instead he characterized the state as 
a largely administrative entity. For Foucault the state is neither universal nor 
immutable(Foucault 2008, 77/8), rather it is the synthesis of various rationales and 
technical procedures: “The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of 
multiple governmentalities.”(Foucault 2008, 77)  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 C.f the 8 March 1978 lecture, in which Foucault surveys the early forms of governmentality. 
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Having said that, Foucault's definition of the state does not exclude the concept of 
the nation. Following the logic of Foucault's definition of the state, it would be more 
accurate to say the nation is the product of the state rather than the state being the 
product of the nation. Hence, so long as it serves an administrative purpose, the 
concept of nation is compatible with the state within the two principal forms of 
governmentality. 
The concept of population also plays a particularly notable role in Foucault's 
analysis on governmentality. Indeed, Foucault argued that the administrative 
techniques associated with government in the context of politics could only emerge 
once "population" became an object of knowledge. That is to say, population 
enabled a political system in which the people living within a particular territory 
could be understood in quantifiable terms and, crucially, administered as a 
collective entity. It should be noted that the territory administered by the state could 
correspond to a national community, but this is not necessarily the case. Many 
different communities could potentially exist within a single territory. 
Once population was conceivable, another critical element of governmentality 
emerged: that is an economic rationale to define the nature of the administration. 
The police and liberal governmentalities differ most pronouncedly in their economic 
rationales. 
In the case of the police mode, the rationale is to maximise the growth of the 
population and in turn the state's wealth. For liberalism the imperative is to stabilise 
the economy by increasingly isolating it from the state. This allows economic forces 
to achieve balance, even if, from an individual perspective, equilibrium is periodically 
disturbed by crises that cause the economy to fluctuate wildly and result in 
individual hardship. 
Further, although the police and liberal governmentalities envisage a network of 
states existing in harmony with one another; the relationship that establishes this 
harmony has a different character within the two forms of governmentality. In the 
police mode, the relationship is competitive. Each state must rigorously pursue its 
own self-interest but in so doing a balance will be achieved between states. 
Competition will ensure that no state will achieve dominance permanently and any 
desire to embark on large-scale war will be negated because it is in no state's 
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interest to undermine the system to a point where it is unbalanced and the potential 
for generating wealth is lost4: 
“Raison d’État [Foucault is referring to the police mode here], on the other 
hand, accepts that every state has its interests and consequently has to 
defend these interests, and to defend them absolutely, but the state’s 
objective must not be that of returning to a unifying position of a total global 
empire at the end of time.”(Foucault 2008, 6)  
In the liberal mode, the relationship is even less confrontational. If economic balance 
is to be maintained, all states must allow the free trade of goods and circulation of 
people so that commodities and labour can be allocated to where they are needed 
in the regional and global economies.  
There is a final common feature between the two governmentalities: although 
Foucault did not employ this term, the final commonality could be defined as a 
continuum of authoritarianism, with both the police and liberal governmentalities 
occupying a space upon it.   
Underlying the continuum is the relative adherence to the rule of law. In other words, 
the continuum would stretch from a system where the rule of law is sacrosanct, 
meaning that the power of authorities are defined and controlled by the law, to 
another extreme where authorities can assert power arbitrarily. At one extreme, 
individuals would possess significant freedoms to control the direction of their lives, 
while at the other the life of an individual is controlled through absolute coercion. 
On the basis of the 21 February 1979 lecture, it is possible to situate the police and 
liberal governmentalities on the continuum. The police state would be associated 
with despotism in that neither system complies with the rule of law. However, the 
police state would not occupy the extreme edge of the continuum in that it differs 
from despotism in some significant respects. In despotism, the sovereign’s will 
forms the law, which is in turn enforced by public authorities. In the police state, a 
public authority sets the law and enforces it upon the ‘population’ (Foucault 2008, 
168). Clearly there is some overlap here: the population has no voice in the creation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Obviously some parallels can be drawn here with notions of a “balance of power” in realist 
theories. However, Foucault’s description of balance in Europe shows no direct influence 
from this school of thought. Foucault’s emphasis on competition, his exclusive focus on 
Europe and the pre-eminence of economic matters in his theory, all serve to set him apart 
from the established approaches of International Relations theory. Nevertheless, in the 
future, these sections of the lectures may become the staple of subsequent critiques on the 
relevance of Foucault’s work to political theory. 
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of the law in both instances. The difference lies in that within despotism the law 
emerges from a single figure but in the police state it is created by a bureaucracy. 
On the other extreme of the continuum, Foucault associated liberalism with the rule 
of law5. Under the rule of law, the power of public authorities is described and 
limited by the law: “The rule of law then appears as a state in which every citizen 
has the concrete, institutionalized and effective possibility of recourse against the 
public authorities.”(Foucault 2008, 170) Thus, in theory at least, public authorities 
should not be capable of imposing their will arbitrarily within liberal systems. 
Further, a differentiation is made between universal sovereign law and 
administrative law(Foucault 2008, 169). In the case of liberalism then, the formation 
of a strong administrative law enables the creation of legal apparatus necessary to 
sustain a liberal economy. For Foucault, all variants of liberalism, recognize the rule 
of law as essential for the economy to function: “The economy is a game and the 
legal institutions which frames the economy should be thought of as the rules of the 
game.”(Foucault 2008, 173)  
Although Foucault's account indicates that liberalism is at the opposite extreme to 
despotism and the police state, an insight missing from his account is that even 
liberalism will subject individuals to some form of coercion. A liberal government 
must be capable of enforcing rules and it can only do so by retaining the monopoly 
of violence. Hence the separation of administrative and sovereign law has not yet 
resulted in the complete diffusion of sovereignty. 
1.2 Neo-liberalism 
Up to this point, the discussion on governmentality has focused on tracing the 
concept's history from the medieval era to the development of liberalism. The 
discussion will now shift to more contemporary developments to examine modern 
socialism and neo-liberalism. Foucault did not explicitly refer to socialism and neo-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Although this paper will not discuss this issue at length, it should be noted that several 
critics have questioned the claim that liberalism establishes a gap between sovereign law 
and administrative law. Indeed, Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer demonstrates that this 
divide collapses when the system itself is threatened. Further, he argues that in recent times 
liberal rights have been suspended so frequently that the suspension of rights is no longer 
an exceptional circumstance but the norm. Hence Agamben believes that effectively the rule 
of law no longer exists (Agamben 1998). 
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liberalism as governmentalities. However, on the basis of his detailed analysis on 
neo-liberalism in the 1978 lectures, it is clear that neo-liberalism was set to assert 
itself as an alternative to classical liberalism. Foucault was more exact in his 
assessment on socialism, as it has been already noted, he argued that socialism 
has yet to develop an autonomous governmentality. This section will concentrate on 
describing how neo-liberalism operates as a governmentality6. 
The first point to note, as the neo suffix might suggest, is that neo-liberalism marks 
a break with the liberal tradition. It was argued above that the liberal governmentality 
is characterised by a rigid separation of the state and the economy. Liberalism holds 
that some elements within society demand administration according to political 
reasoning while others require economic reasoning. Consequently, the greater the 
separation between the economy and the state, the more effectively both spheres 
will operate. Further the logic of classical liberalism would suggest that when the 
state attempts to manage the economy negative consequences for both politics and 
the economy will inevitably follow. 
However, the fundamental problem with classic liberal theory is that the attempt to 
divide the state and economy never proves entirely successful in practice. History 
shows that even states with loose regulation and free markets have been forced 
periodically to intervene within the economy. Generally, these interventions are only 
justified when major economic crises occur but they may also happen in less 
extreme circumstances for instance to break up monopolies. 
The relationship between the state and economy is also central to neo-liberalism, 
however neo-liberalism advocates a significantly different interpretation of the ideal 
relationship between both entities. According to Foucault, neo-liberalism did not 
regard the economy and politics as being two entirely separate spheres. In fact neo-
liberalism holds that politics is essential for economic activity. If the economy is to 
function, there must be an agent to enforce the rules. Taking the economy as the 
starting point then, neo-liberal theory attempts to build the minimal state necessary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 C.f. Burchell, 1993 – Burchell’s article provides an excellent overview of Foucault’s analysis 
on neo-liberalism. His account is based entirely on audio transcripts, as the lectures had yet 
to be published in French at the time of writing. For this paper a particularly salient point 
Burchell made regarding neo-liberalism and governmentality was that: “The market exists, 
and can only exist, under certain political legal and institutional conditions that must be 
actively constructed by government.” (Burchell 1993, 23) 
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out of the needs of the economy. Thus for neo-liberals the fundamental basis for all 
political structures should be the requirements of the economy: 
“…broadly speaking the problem of the liberalism of the eighteenth century 
and the start of the nineteenth century was to distinguish between actions 
that must be taken and actions that must not be taken… This is a naïve 
position in the eyes of neo-liberals, for whom the problem is not whether 
there are things that you cannot touch and others that you are entitled to 
touch… The problem is the way of doing things, the problem, if you like, of 
governmental style.”(Foucault 2008, 133) 
In summary, the fundamental break neo-liberalism makes from the liberal tradition is 
the result of a willingness in neo-liberalism to engage with the mechanisms of the 
state. This argument may seem counter-intuitive, given the fact neo-liberalism is 
often characterised as an ideology seeking to reduce the state to virtually nothing. 
However, neo-liberals are not anarchists, they seek to shrink the state and 
subordinate it to the economy, but they do not desire its destruction. 
Following Foucault’s analysis, the transition from liberalism to neo-liberalism might 
be described as a movement from a society of consumption to a society of 
enterprise: 
“…what is sought is not a society subject to the commodity effect, but a 
society subject to the dynamic of competition. Not a supermarket society, 
but an enterprise society. The homo œconomicus sought after is not the 
man of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and 
production.”(Foucault 2008, 147) 
This enterprise imperative is manifest in the relationship established between the 
state and the individual. In contrast to the police-state, in particular, the gulf 
between the individual and the state is wide. The neo-liberal state provides the 
absolute minimum of services and only in instances in which a private provider 
cannot be established and the absence of the service would undermine the 
economy7.  
Essentially then, according to Foucault’s analysis, a neo-liberal society would 
consist of individuals competing against one another, completely unprotected by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Comparisons may be drawn between Foucault’s notion of a neo-liberal state and Robert 
Nozick’s concept of a night-watchman state (Nozick, 2003). In both instances the state is 
cleaved to the minimum, with only its basic institutions remaining: the police, judicial 
systems, prisons and the military.  
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the state against fluctuations in the economy. However, this competition should, 
according to neo-liberal theory, result in a balancing of forces, which will eventually 
lead to a balance between individuals, between the individual and the state, and 
ultimately between states: 
“Perpetual peace is guaranteed by nature and this guarantee is manifested in 
the population of the entire world and in the commercial relationships 
stretching across the whole world. The guarantee of perpetual peace is 
therefore actual commercial globalization.”(Foucault 2008, 58) 
To reiterate, this imperative towards enterprise does not necessarily imply the loss 
of the state. As Foucault notes(Foucault 2008, 149) with individuals across the world 
engaging in enterprise, there is a need for the state to provide strong regulations. 
The more enterprises present in society the more likely it is that disputes will emerge 
between individuals and arbitration becomes necessary. 
An illuminating example of the complex relationship advocated by neo-liberals 
between the state and the economy can be found in public education policy. For 
instance, Milton Friedman recognized a need for the state to ensure a minimal 
standard of education across society. He was willing to accept the state’s role here, 
not out of a moral conviction, but because without a minimum standard of 
education across society, citizens would lack the basic training necessary to 
participate in the economy. 
Thus he argued that the state must enforce a rule that all children must be educated 
but acknowledged that it would be unfeasible to expect all parents to be capable of 
privately educating their children. This does not mean that Friedman accepted 
current education policy; he felt that the existing public school system was deeply 
flawed. As an alternative, he proposed a voucher-system in which parents would 
have the option of taking their children out of the public sector, placing them in 
private schools and receiving an allowance towards the cost of their children’s 
tuition. Friedman believed this policy would vastly improve both public and private 
school as: “It would permit competition to develop. The development and 
improvement of all schools would thus be stimulated.”(Friedman 1962, 93) 
Friedman’s analysis on education typifies the neo-liberal view of the state as an 
entity capable of establishing market structures across society. Indeed, in the 1978 
lecture Foucault noted an imperative within neo-liberalism to re-evaluate all existing 
structures within the state in order to determine where elements of markets exist. 
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Once they are found, reform is justified in order to develop these nascent market 
structures. 
Another example of this tendency would be the extensive privatization of public 
services within Britain since the 1980s. These instances follow a pattern. The state 
searches for sectors with no tradition of market-orientated administration but that 
could be reformed to accept management according to market-based indicators. In 
Foucault’s words: 
“…to the same extent that governmental intervention must be light at the 
level of the economic processes themselves, so must it be heavy when it is a 
matter of this set of technical, scientific, legal, geographic, let’s say, broadly, 
social factors which now increasingly become the object of governmental 
intervention.”(Foucault 2008, 141) 
State-intervention cannot however extend to interfering with the economy itself. 
Foucault writes: “government must not form a counterpoint or a screen, as it were, 
between society and economic processes.”(Foucault 2008, 145) By that he means 
in a neo-liberal system the state cannot shield individuals from economic risk. 
There are several implications of the role risk plays in neo-liberalism, particularly the 
emphasis placed on risk and the individual, who must bear the risk of each of her 
economic decisions.  
For one thing, it leads to the fundamental principal that the state cannot engage in 
economic planning. According to neo-liberal theory as far as possible individuals 
should be responsible for their own actions in the economy.  
In terms of political institutions, the implications of neo-liberalism's stance on risk 
would require that government institutions concerned with economic management 
(central banks and financial regulators) to undergo significant reform. It would 
require such institutions to avoid taking any kind of direct intervention within the 
economy. Friedman’s analysis on the Great Depression and the failure of 
government institutions to respond adequately to this crisis typifies the neo-liberal 
stance on economic risk and political institutions. 
Essentially Friedman claimed that the severity of the Great Depression was 
prompted by a failure of government, in the form of the Federal Reserve, to act. 
Thus, in a certain sense, Friedman might seem to favour some kind of central 
banking authority in that the Federal Reserve’s failure would at first glance appear to 
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be a crime of omission. However, Friedman concludes that even a stronger, more 
dynamic, Federal Reserve could not have side-stepped the Great Depression. 
Rather, for Friedman, the Great Depression illustrated the ineptitude of central 
banks.   
He claimed that the Federal Reserve existed fundamentally to prevent such crises 
from occurring, yet when the time came it did not respond: “it [the Federal Reserve] 
exercised this responsibility so ineptly as to convert what otherwise would have 
been a moderate contraction into a major catastrophe.”(Friedman 1962, 38) 
Consequently Friedman argues that such governmental structures are worse than 
useless. Indeed, he goes on to argue that when the government finally acted, “… 
the Great Depression, like most periods of severe unemployment, was produced by 
government mismanagement rather than by any inherent instability of the private 
economy.”(Friedman 1962, 38) 
The example of the Great Depression led Friedman to draw several conclusions on 
political systems and the law. Philosophically, he took the view that crises such as 
the Great Depression are inevitable because human-beings are inherently fallible: 
“Any system which gives so much power and so much discretion to a few men that 
mistakes – excusable or not – can have such far-reaching effects is a bad 
system.”(Friedman 1962, 50)  
In contrast, he felt that collective entities, were no single individual held control, 
most notably the market, did on the whole much better: 
“The Great Depression in the United States far from being a sign of the 
inherent instability of the private enterprise system, is a testament to how 
much harm can be done by mistakes on the part of a few men when they 
wield vast power over the monetary system of a country.”(Friedman 1962, 
50) 
Thus Friedman advocated the creation of a system of robust legal authorities, 
capable of limiting the powers of individual agencies or interests. The political 
system Friedman described is analogous to Smith’s notion of an invisible hand 
guiding the economy. For Friedman, a fair political system does not presuppose 
economic equality. Rather it would constitute a society in which no single agent or 
individual is capable of directing that society to a particular end. 
In practical terms, he argues that just as government is premised on a system of 
rights, economic authorities should be driven by broad principles rather than 
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specific objectives. For instance, that the economy should grow by X amount each 
year, X being somewhere between 3 and 5 percent, rather than according to a 
detailed plan of precisely how the economy will develop in the year ahead. 
The core principal of neo-liberalism then, is that modern government should emerge 
out of the requirements of the economy. Hence, for neo-liberalism, only the 
minimum amount of government as necessary should exist and it should be guided 
by broad rules, such as those Friedman associates with sound monetary policy. 
1.3 Neo-liberalism, the Rule of Law and Planning 
Like the police-state and liberalism, it is possible to put neo-liberalism on the scale 
of authoritarianism. Neo-liberal theorists would certainly regard their principles as 
supporting the rule of law, meaning that they would place neo-liberalism at the 
opposite end to authoritarianism. It should be noted that critics of neo-liberalism 
would claim that it is a profoundly authoritarian system. Indeed, Hardt and Negri 
made such an accusation in their essay Postmodern Law and the Withering of Civil 
Soceiety, which will be examined in more detail below. However, these criticisms 
will be reviewed later: this section will concentrate on examining neo-liberalism's 
relationship to the rule of law. 
The treatment of the rule of law, in neo-liberal theory, is another feature that 
differentiates it from the liberal tradition. Like liberal theory in general, the rule of law 
is a core principal of neo-liberalism. However, within neo-liberalism the rule of law is 
also used as a theoretical concept to contrast their vision from their ideological 
enemy: socialism. 
A useful way to grasp the essence of how the rule of law serves to differentiate neo-
liberalism from socialism is to understand the analogy neo-liberal theorists draw 
between natural and economic processes. Within neo-liberal theory the economic 
cycle is viewed as a “natural process”. The periods of fair conditions, bad weather 
and the occasional cataclysm that occur in nature are synonymous with the 
fluctuations of the economy. Neo-liberal theorists acknowledge that painful 
downturns may occur but they argue that these downturns are inevitable. Hence, for 
neo-liberals, any intervention by the state is useless. In fact, intervention may only 
result in prolonging a crisis. 
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In order for a government to base the economy on natural principles, neo-liberal 
theory holds that certain preconditions must be in place. These "natural" processes 
cannot take place, or operate efficiently, unless the government is under the rule of 
law. Further, contracts must be protected and property rights exist. This requires the 
establishment of an entire legal framework. This means the sovereign must also 
respect the law, by refraining from intervening within the economy. The kind of 
economic planning employed by socialist regimes is anathema to neo-liberalism. 
Having said that, the stance neo-liberal theorists take in relation to the rule of law 
and economic planning is nuanced. To clarify how these issues are treated in neo-
liberal theory this paper will turn to Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, a text 
comparable in status within neo-liberal circles to Capitalism and Freedom. 
In relation to the rule of law, Hayek's arguments reinforce the points noted above. 
He emphasised that in formulating the law, authorities must not attempt to 
anticipate all possible situations. Practically, this is impossible, and it could lead 
eventually to economic planning. Instead Hayek argues that legislation should take 
the form of broad guidelines: 
“As soon as the particular effects are foreseen at the time a law is made, it 
ceases to be a mere instrument to be used by people and becomes instead 
an instrument used by the law-giver upon people and for his ends. The state 
ceases to be a piece of utilitarian machinery intended to help individuals in 
the fullest development of their individual personality and becomes a moral 
institution.”(Hayek 2001, 80) 
With this point, Hayek indicates that, once the state begins to plan certain aspects 
of society, the state will inevitably take on further characteristics of socialism. 
Modern societies would appear in Hayek's work to be virtually bound to become 
socialist, but for the fact their governments exist under the rule of law. Within the 
ideal circumstance, Hayek envisioned that:  
“The state should confine itself to establishing rules applying to general 
types of situations, and should allow the individuals freedom in everything 
which depends on the circumstances of time and place, because only the 
individuals concerned in each instance can fully know these circumstances 
and adapt their actions to them.”(Hayek 2001, 79) 
This comment compares with Friedman's thoughts on the appropriate rules for 
monetary policy. Just as policy should be driven by broad principles so should the 
law be general in character. If the economy is guided by broad principles the result 
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should be that they economy serves no particular interest. Just as, under the rule of 
law, politics should serve no particular interest.  
Hence, neo-liberal theory holds that the economic planning typical of socialist 
regimes fails and leads to an erosion of individual liberty with the state determining 
the course of its citizens' lives. For instance under socialism citizens cannot choose 
their own profession and have restrictions placed on their mobility.  
Hayek, and neo-liberal theory in general, believed that any derivation from free 
market principles would inevitably lead to the state acquiring new powers. On 7 
February 1979 Foucault provided an account on how neo-liberal theory understands 
the process whereby socialism encroaches on liberalism. In this lecture, Foucault 
comments on the decisive influence the Nazi-era had upon the German ordoliberals, 
a group that was a precursor to neo-liberalism. For this group, Nazism acted as the 
ideological enemy. In particular, Foucault emphasised three fundamental features 
that the ordoliberals believe led to the establishment of an authoritarian socialised 
economy: 
1. Nazism, or authoritarianism in general, will be the inevitable 
conclusion of state intervention in the economy. 
2. Nazism is characterised by the unchecked and uncontrollable growth 
of the state across all levels of society. 
3. Through the complete control of the economy and expansion of the 
state, Nazism leads to the collapse of social communities. (Foucault 2008, 
112) 
 
In relation to the first point, the ordoliberal argument was that authoritarianism 
emerged through a gradual intrusion upon the economy by the state. Even 
intervention along Keynesian lines will eventually lead to authoritarianism: 
“The neo-liberals say: Take any of these elements, a protected economy or 
Keynesian-type intervention. These are, of course, apparently different 
things, but you will never be able to develop one without arriving, in one way 
or another, at the other.”(Foucault 2008, 110) 
In relation to socialism then, the problem is how to avoid this slide into 
authoritarianism while completely planning the economy. 
The last points, in the summary, underline a crucial argument neo-liberal theory puts 
forward against the national socialist critique of capitalism. It is often argued that 
capitalism leads to the complete breakdown of communities and an atomizing of 
individuals, where people are purely driven by consumption of increasingly 
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standardized products. Hence the logic of Nazism is that a strong state, 
underpinned by a powerful national identity, is necessary to maintain communities. 
In fact, as Foucault noted, exactly the opposite occurs under fascism. The individual 
is even more atomised, completely subject to the whims of the state.  
Similarly production is standardized to an even greater extent under fascism than 
capitalism. Foucault cites the Volkswagon as one example of this standardization 
(Foucault 2008, 114). As a consequence of this neo-liberal theory concludes: “These 
mass phenomena of standardization and the spectacle are linked to statism, to anti-
liberalism, and not a market economy.”(Foucault 2008, 114) 
The argument being that as the size of the market increases the variety of products 
and services available will diversify. Particularly as an unfettered business cycle will 
lead to more frequent purges of antiquated industries and enable new players to 
enter and exploit niches. Further, given the market would appear to be the superior 
social mechanism, under the neo-liberal view at least, it can also be used as the 
basis for a political system that will cut back the state: 
“Since it turns out that the state is the bearer of intrinsic defects, and there is 
no proof the market economy has these defects, lets ask the market 
economy itself to be the principle, not of the state’s limitation, but of its 
internal regulations from start to finish of its existence and action.”(Foucault 
2008, 116) 
The challenge then that neo-liberalism puts to socialism is that it may not be 
capable of resolving the issues it finds within capitalism. In fact, ultimately, it may 
only serve to further isolate individuals under an abstract social system. It may not 
be capable of valuing labour fairly. This then is the challenge Hardt and Negri face. 
1.4 Socialism and Governmentality 
“I would say that what socialism lacks is not so much a theory of state as a 
governmental reason, the definition of what a governmental rationality would 
be in socialism, that is to say, a reasonable and calculable measure of the 
extent, modes and objectives of governmental action.”(Foucault 2008, 92) 
In the 1979 series, Foucault made some important reference to socialism’s 
relationship to governmentality. Unlike liberalism and the police-state, Foucault 
concluded that socialism lacks an autonomous governmentality. As a consequence 
of this absence, he argued that socialism has only functioned as a kind of checking 
mechanism to liberal governments, or as an ideological foundation underpinning 
authoritarian regimes(Foucault 2008, 92).   
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The major problem with the sections of the lectures in which Foucault comments on 
socialism is the uncharacteristic vagueness of his argument. Foucault raises some 
fascinating insights on how socialism might fit into his theory of governmentality. 
However it is not clear why this absence of governmentality in socialism will 
necessarily result in it becoming an element of an authoritarian or liberal regime.  
Foucault’s analysis indicates that socialism has not successfully developed 
autonomous political institutions from liberalism or the police mode, meaning that 
socialist governments rely upon techniques and mechanisms associated with 
liberalism and the police mode. The most significant issue that this analysis raises, 
however, is that authoritarian regimes, even those inspired by a socialist ideology, 
frequently compound the inequalities and injustices they claim to correct in 
capitalism. The question then is are the flaws generally associated with capitalism 
the fault of capitalism or do they emerge from some other agent? 
Foucault clearly intended to set his critique in opposition to the prevailing 
interpretations of neo-liberalism. He felt other critics had not grasped the essence of 
neo-liberalism, that socialism had not fully appreciated the challenge of neo-
liberalism: 
“You can see that these three types of responses ultimately make neo-
liberalism out to be nothing at all, or anyway, nothing but always the same 
thing, and always the same thing but worse. That is to say: it is just Adam 
Smith revived; second, it is the market society that was decoded and 
denounced in Book 1 of Capital; and third, it is the generalization of state 
power, that is to say it is Solzhenitsyn on a world scale.”(Foucault 2008, 130) 
Further, as mentioned above, Foucault suggests that this absence of an 
understanding regarding neo-liberalism and governmentality, has been instrumental 
in the failure of socialism to so far develop an alternative to liberalism and the 
police-state: 
“…socialism can only be implemented connected up to diverse types of 
governmentality. It has been connected up to liberal governmentality, and 
then socialism and its forms of rationality function as counterweights, as a 
corrective, and a palliative to internal dangers. 
We have seen it function, and still see it function, within governmentalities 
that would no doubt fall more under what last year we called the police state, 
that is to say, a hyper administrative state in which there is, so to speak, a 
fusion, a continuity, the constitution of a sort of massive bloc between 
government and administration. At that point, in the governmentality of a 
police state, socialism functions as the internal logic of an administrative 
apparatus.”(Foucault 2008, 92/3) 
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This is a most provocative claim, but it does not make clear how precisely Foucault 
believed socialism becomes the instrument of liberal or police modes. The general 
impression emerging from the lectures is that it is the result of a lack of an 
autonomous governmental rationale in socialism. Foucault notes that, like liberalism 
and the police-state, socialism has a historic and economic rationale, but it currently 
lacks a governmental reason(Foucault 2008, 91/2). The question then is if Hardt and 
Negri have developed an autonomous socialist governmentality through the concept 
of multitude? The following chapter will evaluate the core features of multitude in 
order to determine if it does indeed constitute such a governmentality. 
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2 The Theory of Multitude 
Hardt and Negri have not explicitly discussed the concept of governmentality within 
Empire or Multitude. Hence this may not seem an obvious concept through which to 
reevaluate the theory of multitude. However, many of the issues Foucault 
commented on within the lectures are relevant to the theory of multitude. Indeed, 
related concepts such as biopolitics are important elements within the theory of all 
three authors. In order to illustrate the relevance of governmentality to multitude, 
this chapter will isolate the core features of multitude and describe their relationship 
to Foucault’s theory. 
Of these issues, the topic of central importance is sovereignty. It is from their 
interpretation of sovereignty’s role in politics that Hardt and Negri derive a critique 
on a range of increasingly complex notions: such as immanence and transcendence 
and political and cultural imperialism. 
The interpretation of sovereignty Hardt and Negri present differs from that found in 
Foucault’s lectures. The difference hinges on the extent to which sovereignty is 
treated as a force relevant to politics today. As noted above, for Foucault, 
sovereignty has become largely irrelevant. Governmentality has transformed politics 
from the preserve of monarchs, engaged in territorial struggles to an administrative 
entity. That is not to say war is no longer an issue, as will become apparent later, if 
anything, administrative politics vastly increases the scale of war.  
In contrast to Foucault, Hardt and Negri believe sovereignty is still a political force. 
In Empire, they describe how sovereignty emerged in the middle-ages and has 
transformed progressively, from an expression of national interest to a global 
transcendental order. Essentially then, for Hardt and Negri, sovereignty and empire 
are synonymous. Thus sovereignty functions to undermine the ability of multitude to 
find political expression. 
The only remnant of sovereignty in Foucault’s account is civil society. Within 
Foucault’s theory, civil society refers to a cultural identity that has the property of 
binding citizens to the community of their birth and early-years. Hardt and Negri 
might recognize this description to an extent; however, they would most likely 
consider this notion of communal identity as a kind of nationalism. The issue of 
nationalism is a vital topic within Empire and Multitude. Foucault did not explicitly 
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discuss nationalism within the lectures, meaning that it is useful to compare the 
analysis Hardt and Negri present on the subject with Foucault’s theory.  
Similarly, it is useful to compare Multitude and Empire with Foucault’s work as 
Foucault’s account on governmentality reveals a flaw in the theory of multitude. 
Although there is significant value in the arguments Hardt and Negri make, 
Foucault’s account indicates that multitude may be compatible with neo-liberal 
practice. For instance, a belief in the importance of personal mobility and an 
absence of national boundaries is essential to both neo-liberal theory and the theory 
of multitude. It is obvious that Hardt and Negri advocate mobility, but it may not 
appear immediately obvious that this is also the case in neo-liberalism. However, 
the lectures indicate that, in its most extreme manifestation, a neo-liberal global 
order would consist of individuals across the world independently selling their 
labour on a unified global market. The effect of each individual independently 
engaging with the market will drive the global economy, and ultimately global 
politics. 
The reason this possible overlap between multitude and neo-liberalism exists lies in 
the fact multitude exhibits certain characteristics of governmentality without 
developing its own unique institutions. 
This argument is explored in more detail in the next chapter. For the moment 
however, it is sufficient to note that in placing the source of multitude’s political 
strength in biopolitical production, a concept that combines Foucault’s theory of 
biopolitics with Marx’s theory of labour, Hardt and Negri establish an economic 
rationale for multitude. Although, Hardt and Negri repeatedly emphasise in Empire 
and Multitude that multitude is an entity that defies quantification, it is fundamentally 
an economic rationale because Hardt and Negri place the source of multitude's 
political system in the labour of the multitude itself.  
As a consequence of this, multitude may once again repeat the fundamental failing 
Foucault attributed to socialism in the lectures: that socialism either operates as a 
checking mechanism within a liberal system or as an internal logic within an 
authoritarian system. In the case of Hardt and Negri then, multitude would function 
as a check on neo-liberalism. If it was implemented it would, for instance, challenge 
nationalism and forms of cultural racism. For that reason then, applying the theory 
Hardt and Negri propose may well qualitatively advance global politics. 
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2.1 Sovereignty and Governmentality 
The concept of sovereignty is a central topic within Empire. Through the course of 
that text, Hardt and Negri observe sovereignty's formation, transformations and 
ultimately its destruction. Sovereignty is also tied to other important concepts within 
Empire such as the nation-state, imperialism, immanence and transcendence. The 
interpretation of sovereignty Hardt and Negri present goes somewhat beyond 
governmentality in that Hardt and Negri situate the concept and the multitude's 
challenge against it, within a long tradition of European political thought: from 
Spinoza, to Marx, to Deleuze and Guattari. However, it remains an abstract concept 
in the work of Hardt and Negri and it is not entirely clear how the multitude should 
respond to it. 
A significant feature of the interpretation of sovereignty presented by Hardt and 
Negri is that it exists in a permanent state of crisis. The following comment on 
modernity is analogous to the nature of sovereignty: 
“Modernity itself is defined by crisis, a crisis that is born of the uninterrupted 
conflict between the immanent, constructive, creative forces and the 
transcendent power aimed at restoring order.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 76) 
Within this quotation, Hardt and Negri describe the fundamental conflict between 
sovereignty and multitude. Sovereignty, which within modernity has transformed 
into imperial sovereignty, occupies a transcendent space above society and seeks 
to conserve established power structures. 
Hardt and Negri trace the crisis of modernity all the way back to the middle-ages: it 
was sparked by a rupture in conventional authority. This rupture was the self-
realisation of the multitude. However subsequent to that initial break, various 
political structures, from the nation-state to imperial sovereignty, have successively 
emerged to prevent the multitude from realising its power. 
Hardt and Negri regard the multitude as the final, just, political system. Multitude 
might be understood as a global community, yet Hardt and Negri do not see it as 
homogenising in any way. Smaller, localised communities will continue to exist, and 
new groups will emerge, but all communities will have a global awareness and a 
common sense of humanity.  
Thoburn captures the minute scale of the multitude, as well as its novelty as a 
collective identity, in the following passage in which he outlines the influence of 
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Deleuze and Guattari on Negri, in particular the effect of their notion of “small 
peoples”: 
“Deleuze and Guattari propose a model of politics which emerges not in a 
space of plentitude, coherence and social mobility – in a People or an 
identity – but in ‘cramped spaces’ and ‘impossible’ positions – in ‘minorities’ 
and ‘small people’. Small peoples find themselves traversed by determining 
social forces that cramp their movement; they have no possibility of settling 
into coherent and autonomous self-determined identity.”(Thoburn 2001, 79) 
However, Hardt and Negri take something of a different stance than Deleuze and 
Guattari, in that Hardt and Negri see a common element underpinning the multitude. 
For all its fractures and seeming disparities, Hardt and Negri believe the multitude is 
pulled together through the accumulation of labour.  
To reiterate, the conclusion of this paper is that the major contribution Hardt and 
Negri have made to political theory is this concept of multitude, which offers a novel 
way to conceptualise identity in an increasingly globalised political and economic 
environment. 
2.2 Immanence and Transcendence 
The interpretation of sovereignty Hardt and Negri present is based on two 
theological concepts: immanence and transcendence8. It is important to understand 
the role these concepts play in their theory because they illustrate that Hardt and 
Negri base their concept of politics on a different source than the sociological 
foundations of Foucault’s reading. This may suggest that Hardt and Negri have 
developed a concept of politics beyond Foucault's administrative understanding. 
However, as will become apparent later, implementing the theory Hardt and Negri 
describe in practice is fraught with challenges. As Hardt and Negri would 
themselves recognise, the danger is that any progress made through direct action 
will be lost once power is re-organised and subsequently distributed to new elites. 
However, for the moment, this account will focus on examining how Hardt and Negri 
translate these theological concepts into politics. 
Immanence is the notion that some aspect of God is present in all living things. For 
Hardt and Negri, this notion relates to politics in that they believe all individuals are 
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8 Drawing on such theological concepts puts Hardt and Negri in a unique position within 
contemporary Marxist theory. Murphy, for example, has praised them for re-introducing 
ontology into Marxism (Murphy 2001). An area he claims was last touched on by Lukács 
(Murphy 2001, 17). 
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linked through labour. In the absence of any transcendent government to exploit the 
productive capabilities of the multitude, Hardt and Negri claim that a just political 
system will spontaneously emerge from the synthesis of the multitude’s labour.  
The notion of immanence is also associated with the emergence of multitude and its 
increasing awareness of itself as a political agent. The following quotation on the 
origins of multitude and empire illustrates this connection: 
“…first, the revolutionary discovery of the plane of immanence; second, the 
reaction against these immanent forces and the crisis in the form of 
authority; and third, the partial and temporal resolution of this crisis in the 
formation of the modern state as a locus of sovereignty that transcends and 
mediates the plane of immanent forces.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 70) 
Thus the emergence of the multitude and empire followed three phases. At the close 
of the middle-ages, a fissure appeared in conventional power structures, that 
enabled the multitude to recognise itself as a political agent. Hardt and Negri 
characterise this as the discovery of immanent power. They describe immanence as 
a creative force that will enable the multitude to produce a truly just politics. They 
repeatedly refer to Spinoza as the pre-eminent philosopher on this subject: 
“Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence… is a philosophy that renewed the 
splendors of revolutionary humanism, putting humanity and nature in the 
position of God, transforming the world into a territory of practice, and 
affirming democracy of the multitude as the absolute form of politics.”(Hardt 
and Negri 2001, 77) 
In the second and third stages of the process, the emergence of the multitude 
prompted a response from the dominant powers in society, which took the form of 
the generation of sovereignty and the nation-state. The second phase then is the 
recognition by the established powers of the multitude’s self-realisation and the 
third is the development of new institutions and structures capable of controlling the 
multitude, albeit temporarily. 
Hardt and Negri describe these new forms as transcendent. Within theology, 
transcendence contrasts immanence. Transcendence holds that God is a 
completely separate entity from the world. Hardt and Negri situate this notion within 
political theory by associating it with empire, characterising it as an abstract system 
that prevents multitude from actualising itself as a political subject. Over time, 
empire has generated transcendent structures such as the nation state and 
sovereignty in order to undermine multitude.  
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With the beginning of modernity, the nature of transcendent power altered as the 
nation-state and sovereignty were increasingly challenged. Hardt and Negri 
describe this new transcendent power as imperial sovereignty. 
Imperial sovereignty is characterised as a global structure, lacking a specific 
territory, and, like previous transcendent political systems, it is sustained through 
the exploitation of multitude: 
“Along with the global market and global circuits of production has emerged 
a global order, a new logic and structure of rule – in short, a new form of 
sovereignty. Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these 
global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world.”(Hardt and 
Negri 2001, xi) 
In summary then, for Hardt and Negri, transcendence within the context of politics is 
characterised as a gradual movement from the multitude accepting a Hobbesian 
sacrifice of power, to the democratic ideal of representative government, to an 
abstract system guided by capital. 
The alternative to politics emerging from this transcendent power is politics 
emerging from immanent power. It is not clear what an immanent system would 
look like, as it has never existed. However, it would appear to be something like a 
system that would spontaneously adjust to the requirements of the multitude. 
The abstract capitalist system could be associated with neo-liberalism, which raises 
the question of whether the alternative immanent form Hardt and Negri propose 
could go beyond the neo-liberal governmentality and actually establish a genuine 
alternative to neo-liberalism. To address this issue, this paper will examine Laclau's 
criticisms of Hardt and Negri, which are focused on the difficulties of implementing 
the theory of multitude and so indicate why it may not be capable of displacing neo-
liberalism. 
Laclau was most critical of the application of immanence within the context of 
politics. He argued that in situating immanence within the multitude, Hardt and 
Negri deny politics expression, meaning that, for Laclau, their theory is in fact anti-
political: “What is totally lacking in Empire is a theory of articulation without which 
politics is unthinkable.”(Laclau 2004, 46) 
Laclau challenges multitude by engaging with the theological debate Hardt and 
Negri drew on to formulate the concept. Laclau approaches the principal theological 
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question that influenced Hardt and Negri from a different angle. The issue that 
Laclau takes up is how can God allow evil to persist if he is almighty, unless God is 
in some way subject to evil. One response to this issue is the immanent critique, 
which indicates that God is present within the world itself, and that evil constitutes 
some kind of phase of development in Him becoming almighty. Hardt and Negri 
adapt this principle to politics by situating immanence within the multitude and 
treating this long struggle with empire as a series of steps towards perfection. 
Laclau argues that within theology immanence is not the only way to resolve the 
presence of evil within the world. Hence there may be alternative ways to translate 
this theological idea into politics than that proposed by Hardt and Negri. Laclau 
posits an alternative solution to the theological problem. His argument is that evil is 
merely a property of the world and in no way connected to God. In political terms, 
his point then is that there can be no final political system: any engagement with 
politics is necessarily only partial. Hence, for Laclau, Hardt and Negri have 
neglected the “asymmetry between actual political subjects and the community as a 
whole.”(Laclau 2004, 25) 
Laclau argues that in not recognising this asymmetry, Hardt and Negri ultimately 
make politics unthinkable. The reason for this Laclau suggests is that there can be 
no universal subject, for that to happen one identity would have to be enforced 
across the world.  
For Laclau the epitome of the attempt to universalise a single subject is found in 
Marx’s theory, specifically in his description of the transition to a completely 
proletarian society: “… the universality of the revolutionary subject entails the end of 
politics – that is, the beginning of the withering of the state and the transition... from 
the government of men to administration of things.”(Laclau 2004, 24) 
There are two problems in the critique Laclau presents against Hardt and Negri. 
First, he has mistakenly conflated the multitude with the proletariat. Although Hardt 
and Negri argue that the multitude is a manifestation of collective labour, it differs 
from the proletariat in several respects.  
The multitude does not seek to impose a single identity across the globe, nor even 
upon a specific territory. Multitude does not preclude the emergence of new and 
different communities, in fact this is one aspect of its function.  
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In Multitude, Hardt and Negri discuss in detail how multitude differs from other 
communal identities.  
For instance, they argue that it differs from the notion of “the people” in that: “The 
people is one… The multitude, by contrast is not unified but remains plural and 
multiple.”(Hardt and Negri 2005, 99)  
Hardt and Negri affirm that the multitude is not underpinned by a single identity, as 
in the case of the nation. They believe the multitude can function as a unifying 
element but, unlike the nation, it does not achieve unity by setting itself against 
other identities. 
Multitude also differs from other loose collective identities such as the crowd or 
mob. The crowd, for Hardt and Negri, is largely an indifferent mass of people. The 
mob is agitated, but this anger is unfocused, meaning it can become destructive. A 
charismatic leader can easily manipulate the mob's hysteria.  
In contrast: “The multitude is an internally different, multiple social subject whose 
constitution and action is based not on identity or unity (or, much less, indifference) 
but on what it has in common.”(Hardt and Negri 2005, 100) The concept of "the 
common" is referred to frequently in Empire and Multitude. It is an amalgamation of 
the labour of each individual within the multitude. Hardt and Negri see this 
amalgamation as the true wealth of humanity and believe it can serve as the basis 
for all political structures. 
The second problem in Laclau's critique on Hardt and Negri is that he dismisses too 
quickly the attempts by Hardt and Negri to define alternative political arrangements 
to the nation-state, which is premised on exclusion. Laclau does not properly 
evaluate the reasoning behind the stance Hardt and Negri adopt. For Laclau politics 
necessarily involves some kind of division between groups: "The "people" is the 
specific subject of politics and presupposes a sharp division in the social body that 
cannot be led back to any kind of immanent unity."(Laclau 2004, 21) 
Where Laclau’s criticisms are apt is in highlighting some potential pit-falls in 
establishing the multitude as a system of collective identity. Indeed the issues 
Laclau raises against multitude are relevant to its application as a governmentality. 
If Laclau's stance that forming a political identity involves some kind of exclusion or 
differentiation between peoples is correct, then there is a danger that the claim 
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multitude can encompass all humanity is merely rhetoric. This leaves multitude open 
to subversion by authoritarian regimes that merely claim to respect the principles of 
inclusion and diversity. 
However, even if Laclau's arguments on political identity and exclusion are 
incorrect, his analysis more broadly points to problems in the theory of multitude in 
respect to governmentality. Underlying Laclau's argument is the issue that 
implementing such grand visions as those of Hardt and Negri is tremendously 
difficult within today's political reality. 
Hence, multitude may never entirely displace neo-liberalism. The plurality of 
identities sustained through multitude is not necessarily incompatible with neo-
liberalism. As long as multitude remains confined to a cultural rather than political 
identity, it is compatible with the global economic and political structures of neo-
liberalism. 
Having said that, there is no prior example of the kind of collective identity Hardt 
and Negri propose. Perhaps then even if the multitude could only manifest itself in a 
cultural identity, it would still constitute a qualitative step forward and could check 
some of the excesses of neo-liberalism.  
It may be the case that Hardt and Negri overestimate the multitude’s potential to 
transform contemporary politics. However, if we do not attach such grandiose 
claims to the multitude, it becomes a more viable concept. If rather than regarding it 
as the final political system, it is instead treated as an alternative way of 
conceptualising political communities aside from the nation-state, then the virtue of 
the concept reveals itself. 
2.3 Constituent and Constituting Power 
Before moving on to examine the specific criticisms Hardt and Negri make against 
the features of existing political institutions, this paper will once again evaluate an 
ontological aspect of the theory of multitude. This section will consider the concepts 
of constituent and constituting power in Negri’s theory9. 
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9 This section will focus on Negri’s theory, as it is in his individual works that he most 
explicitly explores the issue of constituent and constituting power. However, these concepts 
significantly inform the theory of multitude. 
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Both concepts are related to immanence and transcendence. Constituting power, 
which in Negri’s theory describes an animating force that generates novel political 
institutions, corresponds to immanence. While constituent power, which is the 
embodiment of constituting power in institutions, today corresponds with 
transcendence; although it is conceivable that, under the framework of Negri’s 
theory, future institutions could better embody constituting power. 
It is vital for this paper to review constituent and constituting power because Negri’s 
stance on their relationship indicates how multitude might generate political 
institutions. This in turn has implications for multitude’s position as a possible 
alternative to neo-liberalism. 
This section will focus on Neilson’s critique of Negri’s theory in order to examine the 
two concepts(Neilson 2004). Neilson’s analysis is especially notable in that he 
compares Negri’s work directly with another significant Italian scholar within political 
theory: Giorgio Agamben. In analysing Negri against Agamben Neilson touches on a 
number of topics that will be examined in greater detail later in the paper: topics 
such as biopolitics, methods for conceptualizing political change, and sovereignty. 
Indeed, the opposition Neilson finds between Negri and Agamben stems from a 
difference in their understandings of sovereignty. Fundamentally they both agree 
that sovereignty, which was the ultimate embodiment of an outburst of constituent 
power, no longer exists in the traditional sense. The difference Neilson finds 
between the theories is that Negri maintains faith in the possibility of constituting 
power offering an alternative to the traditional political institution of sovereignty; 
whereas, for Agamben, constituent and constituting power have become 
dangerously intermixed, which leads Agamben to question the value of the entire 
Western tradition of political thought. 
This combination of constituent and constituting power is central to the theory 
Agamben presents in Homo Sacer(Agamben 1998). There Agamben suggests that 
politics in modernity is characterized by a permanent state of exception: that the 
suspension of law, which traditionally only occurs in times of revolution or war, has 
become the normal condition of politics. As a result, Agamben argues that today 
everyone occupies the space of Homo Sacer. That is to say anyone can be divested 
of their political rights arbitrarily by the state. 
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Negri accepts the notion of the bare life, but interprets it in an entirely different way: 
“[For Agamben] The apparatus of the sovereign ban condemns humanity to 
inactivity and despair. By contrast, Hardt and Negri claim that the bare life must be 
raised up to the dignity of productive power.”(Neilson 2004, 68) 
Later, this paper will explore in more detail why Hardt and Negri believe there is so 
much productive potential within the bare life. In summary, Neilson characterizes 
Negri’s position as: “Signal of Negri’s argument here is the claim that constituent 
power destroys all the concepts of the modern while at the same time producing 
others.”(Neilson 2004, 69) 
In relation to governmentality, Negri’s stance on constituent and constituting power 
is somewhat ambiguous. The fact that Negri, unlike Agamben, believes constituent 
power still has the potential to generate just political institutions would indicate that 
multitude is capable of establishing a novel governmentality. However, since it is not 
apparent within Negri’s theories precisely what structures he believes could 
represent multitude, the danger that multitude will become an element within a neo-
liberal system cannot be excluded10. 
Having said that, Hardt and Negri have described in some detail the problems with 
existing examples of constituted power. The next section will examine these 
criticisms in order to determine if they could form the basis for a vision on how 
multitude would operate in reality. 
2.4 The Nation State and National Identity 
Although multitude may not transform politics to the extent Hardt and Negri 
imagine, Hardt and Negri offer a richer understanding of how political identity is 
formed in Empire and Multitude than Foucault presented in the lectures11. This 
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10 Neilson concludes his essay by attempting to resolve the opposing positions adopted by 
Agamben and Negri. He turns to the theory of Paul Virno, who he claims resolves the tension 
between constituent and constituting power by introducing a temporal dimension: 
 
“Virno argues that the statement ‘there is potential only when there is act’ holds only 
if one adds a small clause: ‘in time’. In other words, potential exists in time only 
when there is an act.” (Neilson 2004, 75).  
11 Foucault commented on the issues, and connections between, nation, race and class in 
the 1976 lectures (Foucault 2004), but these issues do not feature to a significant extent in 
the two series reviewed in this paper. However, that is not to say there have been no 
accounts on the issue of nationalism in relation to biopolitics and governmentality. Agamben 
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section will evaluate the concept of political identity Hardt and Negri submit. It will 
examine their interpretation of the relationship between the nation-state and national 
identity. As well as their view on the American Revolution, which constitutes the 
clearest account on how they conceive multitude operating in practice. 
Primarily, Hardt and Negri argue that sovereignty and the nation-state exist to 
manage conflict within multitude, thereby preventing it from overthrowing the 
established authorities. Both elements are essential to each other, without a notion 
of sovereignty the nation-state lacks a rationale and the transcendent nature of 
sovereignty is meaningless without the material apparatus of the nation-state to 
enforce its authority. 
Having said that the multitude has consistently challenged the structures of 
sovereignty and the nation-state over time, meaning that the nation-state and 
sovereignty have been forced to adapt. As noted in the previous section, 
sovereignty and the nation-state first emerged as a response to the immanence of 
the multitude. 
The emergence of sovereignty and the nation-state might be regarded as consisting 
of three actions. First, it operates to manage, and so control, the immanent power of 
the multitude. Second, it relies upon an imagined community. Finally, this imagined 
identity is sustained through division and exclusion of people. 
The first point was covered in the previous section. The second two are the main 
issues of this section. Essentially they both concern the maintenance of social 
cohesion within a turbulent political environment.  
Both sovereignty and the nation-state emerged as responses to a crisis in authority 
during the middle-ages. The nation-state became an increasingly essential element 
as sovereignty became more abstract. Initially, sovereignty maintained order 
through a hierarchy of roles across society. Hardt and Negri place the origins of the 
nation in the monarchical state, where the state was considered the monarch’s 
property. God Himself appointed the monarch, so through the monarch the people 
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provides a particularly good example of how biopolitics relates to nationalism. Indeed, he 
finds it strange that, “Foucault never brought to bear on what could well have appeared to 
be the exemplary place of modern biopolitics: the politics of the great totalitarian states of 
the twentieth century.” (Agamben1998, 119). 
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were connected to God. This established a social hierarchy(Hardt and Negri 2001, 
94). 
However, bourgeois culture destroyed this structure. With the rise of the bourgeoisie 
this spiritual notion had to be replaced by an abstract cultural identity. Here, the 
basis of the nation was the idea that a particular territory belongs to a specific 
community. 
Finally with the integration of capitalism and sovereignty, Hardt and Negri argue we 
have reached a point where: “…sovereignty becomes a political machine that rules 
across the entire society.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 87) 
For Hardt and Negri the concept of the nation is premised on establishing a 
collective identity through exclusion: 
“The identity of the people was constructed on an imaginary plane that hid 
and/or eliminated differences, and this corresponded on the practical plane 
to racial subordination and social purification. 
The second fundamental operation in the construction of the people, which 
is facilitated by the first, is the eclipse of internal differences through the 
representation of the whole people by a hegemonic group, race, or 
class.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 103/4)) 
In establishing this homogenous identity, differences within “the people” are, albeit 
temporarily, displaced. Hardt and Negri believe that the nation-state has been so 
effective in instituting difference that national identities appear "natural". 
A crucial component of this naturalisation of national identity is establishing a notion 
of "other". Following a strand of post-colonial theory Hardt and Negri claim that the 
construction of a European “self” was premised on the creation of a non-European 
“other” against which the European identity could be defined: “The negative 
construction of non-European others is finally what founds and sustains European 
identity itself.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 124) 
Hardt and Negri emphasise that the nation-state is transitory. Similarly they argue 
that national identity will disappear, as the exclusions it is premised on are arbitrary 
and cannot be sustained indefinitely: 
"Precisely because the difference of the Other is absolute, it can be inverted 
in a second movement as the foundation of the Self. In other words, the evil, 
barbarity, and licentiousness of the colonized Other are what precisely make 
possible the goodness, civility, and propriety of the European Self. What first 
! 36!
appears strange, foreign and distant thus turns out to be very close and 
intimate."(Hardt and Negri 2001, 127) 
Over time Hardt and Negri argue the other and the European self will merge, 
meaning that the notion of the other becomes unthinkable. The further a community 
is pushed away, the closer it becomes. 
With multitude Hardt and Negri are not seeking to exclude difference and establish a 
single global identity. They repeatedly assert the importance of recognising a 
common humanity, the issue they have with the nation state is that there is no 
understanding of this common project. 
A similar detailed analysis on the construction of identity does not appear in 
Foucault's account on governmentality. Hence examining the work of Hardt and 
Negri alongside Foucault's analysis on governmentality is complementary to 
Foucault's work in that it exposes another dimension of politics. 
For all their criticisms against the nation state, however, there are some contexts in 
which Hardt and Negri acknowledge the concept of the nation has had a positive 
effect. Yet they are careful to qualify these points, arguing that once the nation-state 
is finally established, it inevitably adopts the negative characteristics noted above. 
Examining the passages of Empire in which Hardt and Negri consider the more 
beneficial aspects of the nation is important as it is in these sections that Hardt and 
Negri engage most overtly with political reality rather than theory. 
Positive instances of nationalism for Hardt and Negri include when the subjects of 
colonies have asserted themselves against an illegitimate government, and, in 
particular, the American Revolution. However, Hardt and Negri believe that none of 
these instances have entirely fulfilled their promises of liberty. 
In the first example Hardt and Negri characterise this potential positive form of 
nationalism as subaltern nationalism(Hardt and Negri 2001, 105). They associate 
subaltern nationalism with peoples outside of Europe who were subject to colonial 
occupation. However, Hardt and Negri are still cautious in their praise of these 
instance because for them nationalism is always ultimately a poison chalice: 
“We should emphasize, however, that these ambiguous progressive 
functions of the concept of the nation exist primarily when nation is not 
effectively linked to sovereignty, that is, when the imagined nation does not 
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(yet) exist, when the nation remains merely a dream,”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 
109) 
Hardt and Negri argue that once disparate groups have successfully asserted 
themselves as nations, they will inevitably embrace the negative aspects of the 
nation-state, which all nations must do eventually to establish one community as 
dominant. 
There is, however, another beneficial instance of the concept of nation: the 
American Revolution. 
The case of the United States is significant in that for Hardt and Negri the 
establishment of the US constitution marks the turning point from the dominance of 
the classical transcendent sovereign to a new era of, what they term, “imperial 
sovereignty”. The novelty of the US constitution for Hardt and Negri is that it draws 
power directly from the multitude, despite the fact that this power is ultimately 
reconfigured into a sovereign form: 
“The new sovereignty can arise, in other words, only from the constitutional 
formation of limits and equilibria, checks and balances, which both 
constitutes a central power and maintains power in the multitude.”(Hardt and 
Negri 2001, 161) 
Hardt and Negri discuss the constitution, and the subsequent history of the United 
States, in some detail. Their tone changes significantly when they come to examine 
the more recent history of the United States.  Their analysis on the modern era is 
more controversial. However, their reading of the period initially following the 
revolution, up to the civil war is noteworthy because in these passages on early US 
history they hint at how the multitude might operate as a political agent in reality. 
There are two elements within the constitution and the early years of US history that 
Hardt and Negri identify as particularly significant. First is the fact that the 
constitutional structure of the United States enabled the multitude to play a decisive 
role in the generation of the political system. They suggest that the US constitution 
is founded on constituent power.  
They praise in particular the network of checks and balances established across the 
post-revolutionary American government by the constitution, despite the fact that 
ultimately a new form of sovereignty emerged. 
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The constitution achieves a balance between the requirements of central authority 
and a vibrant multitude. It is capable of this because it effectively harnesses the 
power of the different groups within the multitude. Rather than conflict splitting the 
multitude into disparate groups, conflict accumulates power leading to mutual 
benefits: 
“The constitution was designed to resist any cyclical decline into corruption 
by activating the entire multitude organizing its constituent capacity into 
networks of organized counterpower in flows of diverse and equalized 
functions, and in a process of dynamic and expansive self-regulation.”(Hardt 
and Negri 2001, 163) 
The other element Hardt and Negri comment on extensively is the expansive quality 
of the constitution. They are careful to distinguish between an imperialist strategy of 
expansion and the expansive tendency of constituent power(Hardt and Negri 2001, 
166). 
It is in this section that Hardt and Negri come closest to indicating how multitude 
could operate in practice. Multitude would appear to be a revolution in the Arendtian 
sense of the word(Arendt 1990). That is to say in action, multitude would mark a 
return to a spirit of expansion and inclusion that characterised the post-American 
revolutionary era: 
“This democratic expansive tendency implicit in the notion of network power 
must be distinguished from other, purely expansionist and imperialist forms 
of expansion. The fundamental difference is that the expansiveness of the 
immanent concept of sovereignty is inclusive, not exclusive. In other words, 
when it expands, this new sovereignty does not annex or destroy the other 
powers it faces but on the contrary opens itself to them, including them in 
the network.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 166) 
Perhaps Hardt and Negri avoid claiming that the US experience was entirely 
synonymous with multitude because they do not believe the post-revolutionary 
United States empowered the multitude. For instance, they moderate their praise for 
the period by noting that the freedom established by the revolution could only be 
enjoyed by one section of the community. Blacks, Native Americans and women 
were not granted equal rights from the start. Nevertheless, over time these groups 
were incorporated into the system, meaning that the post-revolutionary experience 
still remains an important, if partial, model of how the multitude could operate in 
reality. 
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However, as time moves forward, Hardt and Negri argue the US adopted an 
increasingly imperialistic agenda. Their claims on US imperialism are contestable. 
Indeed, perhaps the low point in their argument is the purely militant role they assign 
to the United States in modern global politics. 
Hardt and Negri argue that once the boundaries of the contiguous United States 
were reached a dilemma emerged. Without continuous expansion this multitude 
could not regenerate itself. This provoked two responses. First a retreat back to old 
European-style colonial adventures, an approach Hardt and Negri associate with 
Theodor Roosevelt. Second a strategy to expand the principles of the constitution 
globally, an approach pioneered by Woodrow Wilson. Although Wilson was not 
entirely successful in his day, his efforts prefigure the creation of international 
organisations. 
In the end, however, Hardt and Negri argue that the United States’ role has 
diminished. They see the United States as operating as just one agent in a global 
complex of imperial sovereignty. The analysis Hardt and Negri present on the 
American Revolution and other instances of colonial rebellion help to clarify how 
they envisioned multitude operating in reality. Hence this material contributes to the 
general stance Hardt and Negri adopt in relation to political identity and further 
complements Foucault's account on governmentality as the realization of an 
administrative politics. 
2.5 Imperial Sovereignty and Governmentality 
Hardt and Negri claim that once the nation-state has been displaced the final form 
of sovereignty emerges: imperial sovereignty. Hardt and Negri characterise imperial 
sovereignty as constituting a global force that functions much like a network. This 
final section will discuss imperial sovereignty by concentrating on one aspect of its 
effect, the emergence of cultural racism, and then move on to evaluate the 
recommendations Hardt and Negri make to undermine imperial sovereignty. 
This paper ultimately draws the conclusion that these recommendations are 
impractical. However, the broad principles they are founded upon, such as global 
freedom of movement, may help global politics move a step forward even if they are 
compatible with the neo-liberal governmentality. 
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Beginning with the issue of cultural racism then, Hardt and Negri argue that the 
practices of exclusion traditionally associated with racism persist to this day 
although the practices have adapted to the changing political environment. Racism 
is no longer associated with biology, but instead with culture. Empire is tolerant of 
difference but social inequality persists because assumptions are made of a person 
because of his social background: 
“This pluralism [of empire] accepts all the differences of who we are so long 
as we agree to act on the basis of these differences of identity so as we act 
our race… The theoretical substitution of culture for race of biology is thus 
transformed paradoxically into a theory of the preservation of race.”(Hardt 
and Negri 2001, 92) 
Hardt and Negri argue that the effect of this cultural racism is most apparent within 
industry, where it splits the work-force into national factions. Such division 
undermines workers’ ability to band together and demand recognition of their rights.  
Hardt and Negri propose three stages to this process: inclusion, differentiation, and 
management and control of difference through cultural racism(Hardt and Negri 
2001, 198). If, however we treat it as a general tendency in an increasingly 
globalised market then the account Hardt and Negri offer of racism within modern 
industry appears rather astute. 
It is a recognisable process. The first stage Hardt and Negri propose is that empire 
claims cultural difference is irrelevant. Many multi-national organisations and 
governments indeed claim to adopt policies that preclude the effects of cultural 
difference. However Hardt and Negri suggest this is only a temporary measure. 
They argue that empire merely ignores difference so that it can spread across the 
globe as a seemingly universal system. 
In respect to industry, the fundamental difference between empire and multitude as 
global identities is that empire does not emphasise the commonality of labour and it 
has no interest in establishing new communal identities. Once empire is firmly 
established in a region, tensions emerging from old differences are not challenged. 
In fact such differences are celebrated. Indeed, as populations migrate across the 
world these tensions are solidified in new Diasporas. This is a point of fundamental 
contrast between imperial sovereignty and the colonial projects of European nation-
states: “Whereas colonial powers sought to fix pure, separate identities, Empire 
thrives on circuits of movement and mixture.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 199) 
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Hardt and Negri provide a number of practical examples of the kinds of exclusions 
they believe imperial racism prompts within the work-force. In general, Hardt and 
Negri suggest that large corporations exploit cultural divisions in their work-force 
because it is easier for them to manipulate their employees if they are split along 
ethnic, linguistic and national lines. 
Examples of this manipulation include the management practices of Central 
American banana plantations, were a lack of cultural assimilation undermines a 
diverse work-force banding together collectively to demand better working 
rights(Hardt and Negri 2001, 200). 
Hardt and Negri propose multitude as an alternative political system, capable of 
respecting difference and yet at the same time emphasising a common element 
across all human societies. It contrasts with empire in that it does not seek to 
sideline difference or endorse policies of exclusion. 
Once again the terminology Hardt and Negri employ may seem rather abstract, but 
at its core is a sound argument. For instance, despite increasing integration of 
markets across the globe, cultural and national issues still generate resentment. As 
a result, analysing how multitude could operate as a communal identity, with a 
global reach, is vitally important: even if multitude does not realise the substantial 
global political aims Hardt and Negri advocate. 
Towards the end of Empire Hardt and Negri propose three recommendations to 
displace imperial sovereignty. All three are intended to achieve this by enhancing 
workers' rights. In summary, they are: 
• Enable current illegal migrant workers to receive full citizenship within their 
territory of employment. 
• Establish a general social wage for everyone across the world. 
• Re-appropriate the means of communication.(Hardt and Negri 2001, 396-
403) 
 
The first measure stems from a commitment to the principal of global mobility. Hardt 
and Negri assert: “The general right to control its own movement is the multitude’s 
ultimate demand for global citizenship.” (Hardt and Negri 2001, 400) 
Hence one of the defining features of multitude is freedom of movement. The faith 
Hardt and Negri place in mobility and migration as a means to undermine Empire 
! 42!
has been questioned in some quarters. Returning to Laclau’s essay, he is skeptical 
of how Hardt and Negri interpret migration’s potential in altering global politics. 
Laclau’s major criticism against migration’s role in Empire is that Hardt and Negri 
treat migration as a deliberate, conscious act against empire: “Needless to say, this 
martial concept of the migratory process does not correspond to any reality: 
reasons for various groups to migrate are very different and are not unified around 
any anti-Empire crusade.”(Laclau 2004, 29) His second criticism is that Hardt and 
Negri generalise the concept of migration so much that it becomes meaningless. 
Although Hardt and Negri could refine their concept of mobility, Laclau offers a 
rather glib reading of the role of migration in Empire. Hardt and Negri do not argue 
that people choose to migrate in a conscious effort to undermine empire.  
It is true that Hardt and Negri present a grand vision of borderless free movement, 
but they also note that today the only people who enjoy anything close to this kind 
of freedom is an elite. For the vast majority of people migration is not a choice: 
“Certainly from the standpoint of many around the world, hybridity, mobility, 
and difference do not immediately appear liberatory in themselves. Huge 
populations see mobility as an aspect of suffering because they are 
displaced at an increasing speed in dire circumstances… 
For them, mobility across boundaries often amounts to forced migration in 
poverty and is hardly liberatory. In fact, a stable and defined place in which 
to live, a certain immobility, can on the contrary appear as the most urgent 
need.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 154/5) 
Thus, the role of migration in the theory of Hardt and Negri is far more complex than 
Laclau recognises. Hardt and Negri do not simply argue that people migrate in order 
to disrupt empire.  
They observe that the rise of global capitalism has prompted a greater freedom of 
movement for some. However for the majority, migration means illegal migration for 
work and forced migration due to war and oppression. Hence the function of 
migration is somewhat ambivalent within the theory of multitude. Migration works 
both for and against empire. There must be a certain amount of freedom of 
movement across borders for the global economy to function but in resisting 
artificially imposed borders people undermine empire. Nevertheless Hardt and Negri 
maintain that migration is ultimately an essential component on the path to 
liberation. 
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As an initial step toward realising freedom of movement for all they recommend 
establishing a procedure for all migrant workers to claim citizenship in the country 
they work within. They note that this is their most practical recommendation, as it is 
essentially an argument to take the principles of free-market liberalism to their 
logical conclusion: “Hence, the political demand is that the existent fact of capitalist 
production be recognized juridically and that all workers be given full rights of 
citizenship.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 400) 
The fact that this opening of borders does not run against liberalism is important to 
recognise as this is one area in which multitude would appear to be compatible with 
neo-liberalism. 
The second measure advocated by Hardt and Negri, however, clearly runs countary 
to a liberal economic policy. 
The concepts of labour and value in the theory of multitude forms the basis of the 
notion of a social wage. The key factor to note is that Hardt and Negri believe labour 
has become more diffuse and detached from traditional notions of labour, such as 
manual activities. They now believe everyone is constantly engaged in labour. 
Whether that be within an office, entering figures into a database, or even in leisure 
activities. For that reason they believe everyone across the world should be entitled 
to a social wage, even if they do not engage in activities conventionally referred to 
as work. This second recommendation is less convincing than the first: 
implementing a social wage would be politically problematic.  
The final recommendation Hardt and Negri make is more speculative. It is 
speculative in that the action consists of establishing a telos for the multitude to 
unite behind. Essentially the third recommendation consists of, what they describe 
as, the re-appropriation of the means of communication(Hardt and Negri 2001, 406). 
They do not mean re-appropriation in the traditional sense of workers seizing the 
means of production. They see it more along the lines of acquiring control of the 
means of communication. This instruction might seem vague, however, re-
appropriating the means of communication could consist of such actions as citizens 
of authoritarian regimes using the internet to disseminate opinions different from the 
official line. 
However, there is perhaps a less benign aspect to this telos. Hardt and Negri 
believe establishing such a telos is necessary because: 
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“The problem we have to confront now is how concrete instances of class 
struggle can arise, moreover how they can form a coherent program of 
struggle, a constituent power adequate to the destruction of the enemy and 
the construction of a new society.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 404) 
This reference to "enemy" is of concern. It indicates that multitude will have to 
engage in the processes of exclusion that Hardt and Negri previously associated 
with empire and the nation-state. 
This reference to enemy may be a momentary slip on the part of Hardt and Negri, 
but it does point towards a possible problem in implementing multitude. This point 
could support the argument that neo-liberalism will ultimately engulf multitude. 
Putting multitude into practice while preventing neo-liberalism, or other ideologies, 
exploiting its rhetoric is challenging. Neo-liberalism is a particularly difficult case 
because it clearly shares some elements of the economic rationale that underpins 
multitude. 
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3 The Function of Civil Society 
The previous chapter focused on issues that were not examined in detail within 
Foucault’s lectures but that are important in the work of Hardt and Negri: issues 
such as sovereignty, the nation-state and political identity. That is not to say, 
however, there is no reference to these topics in Foucault’s writing or that they are 
incidental. Within the lectures, these topics are frequently approached indirectly, 
most notably through a discussion on the relationship between civil society, and 
neo-liberalism. Hardt and Negri have also commented on civil society, but in texts 
aside from Empire and Multitude. It is in these texts that Hardt and Negri most 
thoroughly critique neo-liberalism. 
The following quotation is an effective summary of the role of civil society in 
Foucault's theory of governmentality: 
“Civil society is, I believe, a concept of governmental technology, or rather, it 
is the correlate of a technology of government the rational measure of which 
must be juridically pegged to an economy understood as a process of 
production and exchange. The problem of civil society is the juridical 
structure (économie juridque) of a governmentality pegged to the economic 
structure (économie économique).”(Foucault 2008, 295) 
This quotation illustrates that, for Foucault, civil society is not a domain autonomous 
from politics. Rather it operates as a response by established powers to the 
challenge that the liberal governmentality puts to sovereignty.  
This challenge emerges from a conflict between the economic imperative of 
liberalism and the old legal structures of classical sovereignty. Foucault argued that 
the economic imperative of liberalism generated an economy that is unintelligible to 
the sovereign, or for that matter any individual. This established a situation in which 
the sovereign was obliged to renounce power. This renunciation puts strain on the 
institutions of sovereignty. A strain that neo-liberalism made all the more intense. 
Foucault claimed that civil society emerged in order to compensate for the 
pressures a free market economy puts on sovereignty and the nation-state. This, in 
part, explains why an entirely open terrain for free-trade, such as that advocated by 
neo-liberals, has yet to emerge. 
Finally, the instrumental quality Foucault associates with civil society is tied to a 
change in the nature of law. It is part of a shift towards a purely administrative, 
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rather than rights-based system. There is a strong sense in Foucault's account that 
this shift comes at a political cost. 
Hardt and Negri have also commented on civil society, however, they submit an 
interpretation that has some notable differences from Foucault’s in respect to its 
nature and function. Hardt and Negri present an interpretation of civil society which, 
in common with Foucault’s interpretation, treats civil society as an instrument of the 
dominant powers. However, Hardt and Negri believe civil society no longer exists: a 
situation that in turn enables global politics to adopt a neo-liberal character. 
Hardt and Negri recognize that neo-liberal theory seeks to establish an unmediated 
relationship between the state and the individual. Yet they argue that the rhetoric 
neo-liberal theory employs to describe this relationship is misleading. Hardt and 
Negri do not believe neo-liberalism has led to a dramatic shrinking of the state. 
Instead they argue that neo-liberal governments have, counter-intuitively, 
significantly increased the size of the state by substantially increasing military 
spending.  
Further, they argue that neo-liberalism has expunged identity from politics, but in 
doing so, they believe it facilitates the enforcement of just one perspective within 
politics, which gives politics, what they describe as, a dangerous moral imperative. 
Hence, the analysis Hardt and Negri present indicates that neo-liberalism has in 
practice led to politics becoming even more authoritarian. 
This paper will argue that Hardt and Negri adopt an entirely negative view of neo-
liberalism because their account lacks a developed understanding of 
governmentality. In the absence of such an understanding, they fail to appreciate 
that neo-liberalism, like any form of governmentality sits on a scale of 
authoritarianism. Hence, there is always the possibility of a neo-liberal 
governmentality sliding into authoritarianism. Further, in conflating authoritarianism 
and neo-liberalism in this way, Hardt and Negri ignore the possibility that multitude 
could also adopt authoritarian characteristics. 
Indeed, drawing these comparisons on the subject of civil society reveals a host of 
areas in which the theory of multitude overlaps with neo-liberalism. In particular, the 
challenge neo-liberalism makes to national sovereignty and in the necessity of 
freedom of movement. As a consequence of these comparisons, it may be the case 
that Hardt and Negri do not offer such a radical alternative to neo-liberalism. The 
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result of this is that they fall inline with Foucault’s comments on the general failure of 
socialist theory to respond to neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, the multitude represents 
an important strategy in cultivating novel collective global identities. 
3.1 Neo-liberalism's Challenge to Classical Sovereignty 
The principal issues to comment on are the nature of the challenge neo-liberalism 
puts to classical sovereignty, and, consequently, why civil society became a 
necessary element to protect traditional sovereignty from the extreme implications 
of neo-liberalism. This opposition to classical sovereignty on the part of neo-
liberalism connects neo-liberalism to the theory of multitude despite the fact Hardt 
and Negri would vehemently oppose such an assertion. 
Foucault's account indicates that an intellectual and practical review of the notion of 
sovereignty was almost inevitable once government moved from the household into 
politics. 
Prior to the sixteenth-century the sovereign had a distant, or transcendent, 
relationship to the people of his territory. Foucault cited The Prince as the most 
complete exposition on the traditional mode of sovereignty. He found in 
Machiavelli’s account, the transcendent sovereign. Transcendent because he is in 
no permanent sense bound to his people. The sovereign either inherits or acquires 
his territory through force.  
Hence, Foucault argued that later concerns such as managing the well-being and 
wealth of his subjects were of little interest to the sovereign. All that matters within 
Machiavelli’s theory is that the sovereign retains power. The sovereign's focus is on 
territory, not the people, and his overriding concern is protecting this territory from 
an external enemy or internal rebellion. In this scheme, government plays no role in 
politics. 
However, at some point in the sixteenth century, a change occurred. It is at this 
point that the notion of population emerges, and it is assumed that the sovereign 
has a responsibility to protect its "well-being". Institutions such as the police came 
into existence under the rationale for protecting the safety of citizens. Similarly it 
was increasingly expected that the sovereign should ensure that citizens could 
enjoy good health and a reasonable degree of financial stability. 
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This assumption becomes permissible because of the emergence of population as 
an object of knowledge. Foucault suggests that before the sixteenth century, 
government was confined to the household and pulpit because it had no political 
object. The intellectual development of population enabled certain forms of 
knowledge and subsequent practices to develop. Now the sovereign in the form of 
an individual, or an institution, must conceive instruments, such as the police, 
capable of enforcing standards and conduct to ensure the population remains 
healthy and prosperous.  
Osborne offers a practical example of this new governmental procedure in action. 
He has demonstrated how a concept of public health drove forward extensive state 
intervention within major industrial cities in the seemingly laissez-faire regime of 
Victorian-era Britain. Of course this intervention was undertaken for purely 
calculated and rational reasons, rather than out of a sense of compassion. 
Ultimately it cost the state less to prevent illness than to clean up the mess when 
the poor died out(Osborne 2005). 
Essentially Foucault sums up the difference between the object of politics in the era 
of classical sovereignty and that of the governmental era as: “… government is not 
related to the territory, but to a sort of complex of men and things… “Things” are 
men in their relationship with things like customs, habits, ways of acting and 
thinking.”(Foucault 2008, 96) 
In general, Foucault argues that government increasingly penetrates all levels of 
society: from the home to the church and ultimately to the sovereign himself. Good 
governance is seen as essential not just on a personal or familial level, but also in 
the highest domains of politics.  
Thus the remit of government is far more encompassing than that of classical 
sovereignty. This remit puts incredible pressure on the established concept of 
sovereignty. The pressure is exerted on two fronts corresponding to the police and 
neo-liberal modes. However, the challenge neo-liberalism puts to classical 
sovereignty is far greater than that of the police rationale.  
The classical concept of sovereignty is challenged in that it alters the system 
through which the sovereign asserts power. No longer is the sovereign simply 
transcendent and he cannot exclusively devote himself to retaining power over a 
particular territory. Instead he must immerse himself in the administration of the 
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population. Indeed, sovereignty increasingly moves from being embodied by a 
single individual to bureaucracies capable of managing such large tasks as 
administering an entire population. 
Further, as noted above, territorial expansion is not the principal goal of the police 
governmentality. Rather it is a balancing and organising of forces into a strong and 
stable network of powers. 
Neo-liberalism challenges classical sovereignty in an even more fundamental way. 
The domain of government in this system is significantly reduced from previous 
eras. The core belief is that no single person, not even the sovereign, can fully 
understand the economy and this same model should be applied to politics. Hence, 
even in the older liberal tradition, in which the imperative was to keep politics and 
the economy as separate as possible, it was an overall economic imperative that 
determined society’s political structures. 
That being the case, it is useful to unpack the concept of Homo Œcomicus, which 
Foucault discusses in the final two lectures, in order to appreciate the increasing 
influence of economic forms on political systems. In particular how neo-liberalism 
undermines classical sovereignty. 
We might regard this figure as the ideal subject of a neo-liberal regime. He has no 
connection to the state, or community in any deep sense, and is motivated purely 
by self-interest. Foucault contrasts Homo Œcomicus with ‘the subject of right’. The 
subject of right is an older figure, imbued with a legal status that is lacking from 
Homo Œcomicus: 
“…the subject of right is integrated into the system of other subjects of right 
by a dialectic of the renunciation of his own rights or their transfer to 
someone else, while Homo Œcomicus is integrated into the system of which 
he is a part, into the economic domain, not by a transfer, subtraction, or 
dialectic renunciation, but by a dialectic of spontaneous 
multiplication.”(Foucault 2008, 292) 
These two regimes then tend to work against each other, Homo Œcomicus in 
particular challenges classical sovereignty. The reason for this, once again, is that 
the economy is such a complex entity that no single person can understand it in its 
entirety. Indeed, opportunities and risks are created precisely because different 
individuals within the economy possess different amounts and kinds of information. 
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Foucault characterises the increasing dominance of the economy as a serious blow 
to classical sovereignty: 
“Homo Œcomicus strips the sovereign of power inasmuch as he reveals an 
essential, fundamental, and major incapacity of the sovereign that is to say 
an inability to master the totality of the economic field.”(Foucault 2008, 292) 
Accepting that liberalism undermines classical sovereignty does not necessarily 
connect Hardt and Negri to neo-liberalism, despite the fact neo-liberalism also 
challenges classical sovereignty. In order to establish that there is indeed some 
connection between the theory of multitude and neo-liberalism through this subject, 
this paper will highlight a series of features from The Constitution of Liberty that 
challenge conventional notions of sovereignty in a manner similar to the challenge 
put by multitude. 
The core issue with this analysis is the concept of freedom. Hayek traces the notion 
of freedom back to ancient Greek society. In this society, freedom contrasted 
starkly with slavery. In the modern world, with complex structures such as the 
nation-state, defining freedom might not seem such a simple task. However, Hayek 
maintained that the ancient Greek example was still relevant. The fundamental 
difference between freedom and slavery then as now, Hayek claimed, is an absence 
of coercion: “…‘freedom’ refers solely to a relation of men to other men and the only 
infringement on it is coercion by men.”(Hayek 1960, 12) 
For Hayek, coercion “…implies both the threat of inflicting harm and the intention 
thereby to bring about certain conduct.”(Hayek 1960, 134) In this quotation, Hayek 
voices the notion prevalent across all neo-liberal theory that a liberal state cannot 
compel an individual to do a particular action towards a specific end. 
From the single principle that freedom is defined by the absence of coercion, Hayek 
develops a series of political implications. These implications are significant in that 
they reveal the radical strain within neo-liberalism, which Foucault felt socialism had 
not confronted. Hayek’s analysis thus indicates why neo-liberalism challenges 
conventional sovereignty. 
Hayek claimed that the freemen of Greek city-states possessed four fundamental 
rights not granted to slaves: 
i. legal status as a protected member of the community 
ii. immunity from arbitrary arrest 
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iii. the right to freely choose a profession 
iv. the right of free travel(Hayek 1960, 18) 
 
Hayek also adds to this list, the right to own property, he chose not to include this 
right in the main list as even slaves had the right to own property in ancient 
Greece(Hayek 1960, 18).  
It may not appear immediately obvious how these points connect Hayek's analysis 
with Hardt and Negri. However, if this list of rights, with the exception of the right to 
own property, were fully implemented across the world, the result would be such 
radical political changes that the world might not be too far removed from the ideal 
Hardt and Negri describe in Empire and Multitude. 
The vision that anyone could have automatic legal status in the community of their 
choice, that no one could be arrested arbitrarily and that anyone could travel and 
work in a profession of their choosing in any country is by today’s standards a 
radical ideal. This concept of freedom is comparable to that found in the theory of 
multitude in that in both instances the principles of freedom of movement and for 
individuals to engage in economic activities are central. 
That is not to say Hayek's theory and that of Hardt and Negri parallels entirely. For 
instance, Hayek argued strongly that an established elite is necessary to guide 
civilisation forward. Although he qualified this point by arguing that the gap between 
rich and poor should not be so great as to allow anyone to fall into desperate 
poverty. Nevertheless Hayek maintained that a relative gap between rich and poor 
was necessary to ensure continued social progress. 
Another important characteristic of Hayek’s concept of freedom is that freedom is 
defined in private rather than public terms: 
“Freedom thus presupposes that the individual has some assured private 
sphere, that is some set of circumstances in his environment with which 
others cannot interfere.”(Hayek 1960, 13) 
Thus we might characterise Hayek’s notion of freedom as granting the individual 
freedom from politics. Applying this principle would vastly reduce the scope of the 
state. Indeed ultimately the only purpose left for the state would be to enforce the 
law. Of course it is unlikely that the state would ever shrink to such an extent. In 
Capitalism and Freedom Friedman discusses in some detail situations in which the 
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state would be obliged to adopt a monopoly12. However, he argues this should only 
occur grudgingly when no private provider for the service can be found. In that 
sense state involvement beyond enforcement of the law goes against neo-liberal 
principles, even if in reality, it is unlikely that the state could ever be reduced to such 
an extent. 
The issues involved in enforcing the law raises a further problem of maintaining 
freedom within society. According to Hayek, the difficulty in protecting freedom is 
twofold. On the one hand, there is a danger individual citizens might abuse their 
freedom, and attempt to coerce their fellow citizens. On the other, it is possible that 
a profoundly illiberal faction could abuse their freedom and attempt to establish an 
illiberal government. For these reasons Hayek argues that the state must have the 
option of deploying coercion if an individual or group threatens the freedom of 
society as a whole. 
However, the crucial point is not that Hayek's analysis and that of Hardt and Negri is 
interchangeable. The point is that there is sufficient overlap between the two 
approaches that if multitude were established in practice there would be sufficient 
space for neo-liberalism to encroach on its position. For this reason then, Hardt and 
Negri have not gone sufficiently far to develop a unique socialist governmentality. 
3.2 Sovereignty and Civil Society 
It was suggested above that, for Foucault, civil society was pivotal in preventing 
neo-liberalism toppling sovereignty. The reason why Foucault believed this to be the 
case may not seem obvious at first. This section will explore the logic behind this 
aspect of Foucault's analysis. This section will also further examine how neo-
liberalism undermines civil society and how this action connects neo-liberalism with 
the theory of multitude: thereby indicating that multitude may not offer a true 
alternative to neo-liberalism in practice. 
Across the span of the lecture series, Foucault developed a detailed description of 
the structures and key features of a neo-liberal society. However, clearly this 
description does not match the reality of politics today. Indeed, Foucault believed 
that a pure neo-liberal system had yet to come into existence. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 C.f. “Monopoly and the Social Responsibility of Business and Labor” (Friedman 1962).  
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One of the reasons why this has not occurred, Foucault suggested, was due to the 
enduring presence of civil society. According to Foucault’s theory, civil society 
works against neo-liberalism. However, Foucault does not attribute this to the 
common assumption that civil society possesses some autonomous quality that 
distances it from politics and so neo-liberal policies. Rather Foucault argued that 
civil society functions to maintain conventional forms of national sovereignty 
threatened by neo-liberalism. 
Civil society is capable of undermining the challenge neo-liberalism puts to classical 
sovereignty because it challenges the application of tough free-market principles in 
some crucial respects. Where capitalism requires self-interest, a mobile population 
and freedom to move across borders, civil society, in Foucault’s view, seeks to root 
individuals within communities. It does not impose restrictions on movement across 
borders, because this is not necessary. The bonds established within communities 
would be such that individuals would feel great attachment to their homes and have 
little desire to leave(Foucault 2008, 303). 
This argument holds true to conventional interpretations of civil society, in its 
emphasis on the importance of community. However, this aspect of civil society 
enables national sovereignty to persist despite the tendency of neo-liberalism to 
undermine sovereignty. Thus for Foucault civil society is not autonomous from the 
dominant political system but rather it is its instrument.  
Foucault's notion of civil society is quite novel and his account on how it formed 
reveals some important connections between neo-liberalism and the theory of 
multitude. 
The final lecture of the 1979 series is devoted to the issue of civil society. Foucault’s 
primary source was Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society. From 
Ferguson, Foucault draws four key points: 
i. Civil society should be understood as a historical-natural constant. 
ii. Civil society is based on a principle of spontaneous synthesis. 
iii. Civil society is a matrix of political power. 
iv. Civil society is the motor of history(Foucault 2008, 297/8)  
This section will now comment on these four topics and discuss how Foucault 
developed his own interpretation of civil society on based on Ferguson’s account. 
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The idea that civil society is a historic constant is important, as it justifies the 
established political systems on the basis of historic precedent, by indicating that 
present structures are in someway “natural”. 
Ferguson believed civil society was an inherent property of human interaction, that it 
naturally emerged when a group of human-beings met. Thus civil society is, at its 
most basic, simply a lose community of individuals living and working together. 
Ferguson cited a group of children shipwrecked on an island, who eventually agree 
to work as a community in order to sustain themselves, as the ideal example of his 
concept of civil society. 
The second point that Foucault draws from Ferguson is the notion of “spontaneous 
synthesis”. Foucault developed two further points from this insight. The first point 
concerns spontaneity and follows on from the argument regarding the “naturalness” 
of civil society. Ferguson emphasised that not only was there a natural tendency for 
people to form civil society groups, but that these groups emerge spontaneously 
instituting conventions over time. 
However, Foucault found that even this characteristic served a utilitarian function. 
These civil society groups do not just emerge on isolated islands, they appear 
everywhere and serve to compound established norms and conventions. However, 
since it appears that these communities emerge spontaneously, they exhibit a 
seeming naturalness despite the fact they are ultimately the products of convention. 
There is another element to the second point: that of synthesis. The issue of 
synthesis is somewhat more complicated than the first aspect in that, this element 
enables the current system to utilise liberal principles without altering the nature of 
present-day sovereignty. 
Essentially, this process of spontaneous community formation is not only necessary 
for civil society but also, to a certain extent, for liberalism to function. Economic 
activity establishes a form of spontaneous community in that it brings together 
people unknown to each other. For instance, today trade increasingly brings 
together people from different countries and cultures. There must be some degree 
of trust between these parties if a successful economic exchange is to take place.  
Yet there is also an individualising tendency in liberalism. It is necessary for 
individuals to pursue their own self-interest if the economy is to function. As a 
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consequence of this contracts are drawn up to protect individuals within exchanges. 
Thus it is perhaps not so much that individuals trust one another but that they trust 
in the legal framework. 
Foucault suggested that this legal structure, compounded with the international 
focus of liberalism and requirements of people to be mobile and prepared to leave 
their communities ultimately undermines civil society. Foucault characterised this 
situation as a spontaneous synthesis: “… a spontaneous synthesis within which the 
economic bond finds its place, but which this same economic bond continually 
threatens.”(Foucault 2008, 303) 
Foucault then went on to outline how civil society help to maintain the nation state. 
Through the process of spontaneous synthesis, the economic virtues of liberalism 
are exploited, but only to a limited extent. The potential for liberalism to breakdown 
territorial boundaries is curbed by civil society.  
The third point Foucault drew from Ferguson’s account is that civil society 
constitutes a matrix of political power. Foucault developed this notion of a matrix in 
order to differentiate the current system from the rights-based structure of classical 
sovereignty. 
Foucault argued that the current system of national sovereignty is unique in that it is 
based on quasi-natural rather than conventional or established rights. Historically 
nation-states may have been established on the bases of constitutions with legal 
force. However, the lectures indicate that nation-states only persist today on the 
bases of the seemingly natural agent of civil society. Hence this matrix of political 
power applies an impoverished model, that emerges from civil society, across 
politics.  
Obviously, within the context of politics, following the structure of civil society 
cannot equate to generating new political institutions constantly. Rather it has two 
characteristics: First it means that power is determined according to the agent 
within the system who happens to possess the most power at that moment. 
Second, spontaneous or natural systems do not require the renunciation of power 
by individuals. Instead power, emerges spontaneously from the talents and abilities 
within the population. In positive terms, this means there is far greater social 
mobility than previous eras. The downside of this, however, is that it does not 
necessarily offer any of the protections of a rights-based constitution. As Foucault 
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noted: “…there is no constitution of sovereignty by a sort of pact of 
subjection.”(Foucault 2008, 300) Thus there is nothing to constrain the sovereign’s 
power.  
In summary, Foucault expressed the rationale behind this logic in the following 
quotation: 
“… individuals have assumed authority and others have allowed these to 
acquire authority over them. Consequently the fact of power precedes the 
right that establishes, justifies, limits, or intensifies it; power already exists 
before it is regulated, delegated or legally established… The juridical 
structure of power always comes after the event of fact of power 
itself.”(Foucault 2008, 304) 
It is important to note at this point that neo-liberal theorists repeatedly emphasise 
that the rule of law is sacrosanct to any liberal system. Therefore they see liberalism 
as part of a constitutional tradition. In many ways Foucault’s argument on civil 
society reveals what happens when liberal ideals are only partially manifest.  
Hence, following the principles of liberalism through to their conclusion, although 
sovereignty would no longer exist, the values of a rule of law system would remain. 
This stands in contrast to the prevailing tendency of civil society. 
To a certain degree Foucault's closing remarks on civil society contradict his 
argument that it is in the service of the nation state. In the closing lecture of the 
1979 series Foucault considers the question, if people are capable of forming 
societies spontaneously through civil society then where is the need for the 
apparatuses of the state, why not simply dispense with the state and its 
apparatuses? 
“Could not society exist without government, or at any rate, without a 
government other than that created spontaneously and without need of 
institutions which take charge of civil society, as it were, and impose 
constraints which it does not accept.”(Foucault 2008, 310) 
However, this argument is not so much a contradiction as the end-point of 
Foucault's discussion on civil society. 
At a certain point the processes Foucault associates with civil society may become 
so extreme that even the nation-state is no longer necessary. Under this scenario all 
political structures will emerge from quasi-natural processes. 
! 57!
This argument relates back to the theory proposed by Hardt and Negri in the sense 
that the concept of civil society described by Foucault is analogous to empire. 
The final issue Foucault remarked upon in Ferguson’s account is that civil society 
represents the motor of history. By that Foucault means that the matrix of political 
power Ferguson described now occupies the ground for all social, political and 
economic transformations. This notion is comparable to the argument Hardt and 
Negri present that empire imposes itself globally through similar structural 
transformations. 
The fact that liberalism so strongly opposes this natural paradigm for politics closes 
the gap between neo-liberalism and the theory of multitude. The fact that the 
concept of civil society Foucault described so closely resembles empire means that 
like multitude the political systems within liberalism are opposed to empire. 
Having said that, Hardt and Negri have written on the subject of civil society. They 
draw some notably different conclusions to Foucault on its nature and function. This 
paper will now move on to consider their interpretation and consider if their analysis 
challenges any aspects of the comparison between the theory of multitude and neo-
liberalism. 
3.3 Civil Society and the Theory of Multitude 
Although there is little reference to civil society in Empire and Multitude, it is an 
important issue within the work of Hardt and Negri more broadly. Indeed, reviewing 
the texts in which Hardt and Negri present their theory on civil society is particularly 
important for this paper as it is in these texts that Hardt and Negri most thoroughly 
examine the concept of neo-liberalism. 
Unlike Foucault, Hardt and Negri believe that civil society is today largely irrelevant. 
The redundancy of civil society is related to their understanding of labour. For Hardt 
and Negri, civil society may have been relevant to earlier periods when labour was 
not completely isolated from politics. However, with the expulsion of labour from 
today's politics the role of civil society has diminished.  
There are aspects of their argument analogous to Foucault’s thoughts on civil 
society. Neither Foucault or Hardt and Negri recognise an autonomous civil society; 
they all see it is the product of dominant powers.   
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However, what function civil society served historically has been largely displaced 
according to Hardt and Negri. This interpretation of civil society differs significantly 
from Foucault's view, in that, according to Foucault, for sovereignty to remain civil 
society must continue to exist to temper the excesses of liberalism. 
This point highlights another significant difference between Foucault's interpretation 
of civil society and that of Hardt and Negri. For Foucault, civil society is still present 
and tends to undermine the more progressive aspects of neo-liberalism. Whereas, 
for Hardt and Negri, civil society constituted another form of oppression that has 
been superseded by neo-liberalism. Hence, the relationship Foucault defines 
between civil society and neo-liberalism differs significantly from that assumed by 
Hardt and Negri.  
The progressive aspects of neo-liberalism, which Foucault proposed, reveal a 
connection between neo-liberalism and the theory of multitude. This connection 
stems from the central role labour plays within the theory of multitude. Labour 
connects multitude to other forms of governmentality. In deriving their political 
theory from labour, Hardt and Negri inadvertently endorse a core attribute of 
governmentality: that politics must derive from an economic rationale. It is these two 
elements then, an oversight on the part of Hardt and Negri regarding the potential 
merits of neo-liberalism and the emphasis on labour in their political theory, that 
leaves multitude open to the influence of the neo-liberal governmentality. 
3.4 Wither Civil Society I 
Prior to writing Empire with Negri, Hardt wrote a short essay on the subject of civil 
society(Hardt 1995). Despite drawing on Foucault as one of his principal sources, 
Hardt presents an interpretation of civil society that differs from Foucault's in some 
crucial respects. Having said that, Foucault and Hardt broadly share the view that 
civil society serves the agenda of the dominant ideology. In relation to 
governmentality, this difference of opinion does not have a significant impact. It is 
when Hardt, in collaboration with Negri, turns to the subject of neo-liberalism's 
relationship with civil society that the political implications of Hardt's analysis on 
civil society become apparent. In order to fully appreciate these implications it is 
necessary to first understand Hardt's interpretation of civil society. 
Hardt focused upon three theorists: Hegel, Foucault and Gramsci. Hegel’s 
interpretation of civil society is the lynchpin of Hardt’s essay. Hardt suggests that it 
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is from Hegel that the notion of civil society, as it exists today, developed. Before 
Hegel, Hardt argues, civil society was largely synonymous with political society. 
That is to say in the accounts of theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau, civil 
society is one part of a dualism. Civil society is the counterpart to natural society. 
Hence, within this intellectual framework, civil society encompasses what we would 
designate as politics today(Hardt 1995, 28). 
Hegel is the first to define an autonomous domain for civil society, separate from 
politics and nature. 
As a consequence of setting civil society outside politics, civil society becomes an 
element potentially opposed to politics: “Hegel focused primarily on the contrast not 
between natural society and civil society but between civil society and political 
society that is between civil society and the state.”(Hardt 1995, 28) 
Equally, however, Hardt demonstrates that Hegel’s concept of civil society can also 
operate as an instrument of the state. It is through its educative attributes that civil 
society trains citizens in the norms and procedures of the state: “Hegelian education 
in civil society is a process of formal subsumption, a process whereby particular 
difference, foreign to the universal, are negated and preserved in unity.”(Hardt 1995, 
29) 
Aside from defining civil society as an autonomous sphere from politics, Hardt 
suggests that Hegel’s other major contribution to our notion of civil society is in 
establishing a connection between civil society and labour. 
Hardt situates Hegel’s philosophy in the context of the rise of bourgeois culture. In 
particular, Hardt suggests that the economic principles of bourgeois society 
informed Hegel’s theory on civil society. Fundamentally, Hardt’s argument is that 
the notion of labour put forward by Hegel serves bourgeois interests. 
Hardt notes that Hegel has a disdain for “concrete labour” that is basic labour, 
essential for the survival of humanity(Hardt 1995, 30). In Hegel’s view this is the 
labour closest to that of animals and so should be associated with natural rather 
than political or civil society. Civil society, on the other hand, is based upon abstract 
labour: that is individuals seeking self-realisation and, through this process of 
discovery ,arriving at a universal consciousness.  
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The key point then is that although civil society is autonomous from political society, 
and may conflict with it up to a certain point, both ultimately aim to reconcile 
themselves in the same universal consciousness: that is “the state”. 
The emphasis Hardt places on labour in his account of civil society serves to 
differentiate his work from that of Foucault. It also illustrates the centrality of labour 
in his understanding of politics. The next section will consider in more detail the 
implications of the prominent role labour plays in the political theory of Hardt and 
Negri. 
In addition to Hegel, Hardt also drew influence from Foucault and Gramsci. Hardt 
believed that Hegel established the basis for the modern understanding of civil 
society: hence Hardt argues that Gramsci and Foucault emphasise different aspects 
of Hegel's theory. 
For instance, Hardt argues that Gramsci took the potential antagonism between civil 
and political society that Hegel observed, but inverted Hegel’s position. Where 
Hegel saw civil society ultimately leading to the state, for Gramsci, politics is only a 
temporary step towards a global civil society. According to this view, “When civil 
society does manage fully to fill its role, the state as such will no longer exist; or 
rather, state elements will continue to exist only as subordinated agents of civil 
society’s hegemony.”(Hardt 1995, 30) 
It is unfortunate that Hardt did not pursue Gramsci’s argument more thoroughly as 
there is a certain similarity between this notion of a globalised civil society that 
absorbs the state and the expansive character of multitude as a political force. 
However Hardt and Negri would most likely dispute Gramsci’s view, arguing that 
civil society will inevitably be in the service of some agency. 
The third theorist Hardt commented on was Foucault. Hardt argues that Foucault 
drew on a different strand within Hegel's thought. Where Hardt suggests Gramsci 
treated civil society as an entity greater than the state, according to Hardt, Foucault 
believed the state exploits civil society in order to promote its own interests. 
Although this point is not incompatible with the argument Foucault made within the 
lectures, when the position Foucault took is scrutinised in detail against that of 
Hardt, the difference becomes apparent. The difference centres on the issue of the 
relationship between neo-liberalism and civil society. 
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The following section then will focus on evaluating the nature of this opposition, and 
its implications in relation to governmentality. 
3.5 Wither Civil Society II 
Several years after writing The Withering of Civil Society, Hardt examined civil 
society in more detail with Negri in their essay Postmodern Law and The Withering 
of Civil Society. It is in this essay that Hardt and Negri consider the relationship 
between civil society and neo-liberalism. Hardt and Negri approach this discussion 
from an unusual perspective in focusing on Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Their 
reading on Rawls's text is contestable, however this paper is more concerned with 
the implications of the analysis they proposed on the basis of Rawls's theory than 
the merit of the reading itself. 
Essentially, Hardt and Negri characterise Rawls’s liberal theory as the epitome of a 
capitalist system that has been entirely displaced from labour. Although Hardt and 
Negri believe such a displacement is impossible in reality, they argue that Rawls's 
work represents the theoretical extreme of this view. Overall they draw two 
conclusions on the basis of Rawls's account: 
i. They associate Rawls's theory with neo-liberal policies enacted since the 
1980s. That is to say a rhetoric that advocates a thin state and precipitates a 
dramatic cutback in the welfare state, but counter-intuitively prompts a 
massive expansion on spending for military and police forces. 
ii. A proliferation of communitarian critiques on neo-liberalism that emphasise 
the importance of strong national values. (Hardt and Negri 2003, 28) 
 
Hardt and Negri associate both points with a decline in civil society and the 
increasing dominance of neo-liberalism. To a certain extent, the interpretation Hardt 
and Negri present of the relationship between neo-liberalism and civil society 
compares with that Foucault proposes, in that neo-liberalism also appears to 
displace civil society in Foucault's analysis. However, the conclusions drawn 
regarding the outcome of this displacement is significantly different in the work of 
Hardt and Negri. For Hardt and Negri the rise of neo-liberalism is another, more 
intense, form of bourgeois oppression. 
There is also a certain connection between Foucault's understanding of neo-
liberalism and that of Hardt and Negri, in that all three argue neo-liberalism 
establishes a stark relationship between the individual and the state. However, the 
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nature of the challenge neo-liberalism puts to civil society is notably different in the 
account Hardt and Negri present. 
Hardt and Negri principally associate the rise of neo-liberalism with changes in 
labour-forms; specifically, the transition from the formal to the real subsumption of 
labour. Hardt and Negri derive the concepts of real and formal subsumption of 
labour from the Grundrisse. 
Thoburn provides a useful summary of the transition(Thoburn 2001, 77/8) and 
shows how Hardt and Negri transpose this aspect of Marx's theory into their own 
work. He describes the formal subsumption as the phase in which capital first 
attempted to situate itself within the labour system. This process was messy, with 
labour exposing many contradictions in capital. The real subsumption occurs when 
capital has firmly entrenched itself within society, and, through technological 
advance, forces new forms of labour to emerge. As a result of this labour appears to 
be no longer the principal source of value. Instead capital appears to determine 
value independently of labour. In the words of Hardt and Negri: 
“The subsumption is formal insofar as the labor processes exist within 
capital, subordinated to its command as an imported foreign force, born 
outside of capital’s domain… 
The subsumption of labor is said to be real, then, when the labour processes 
themselves are born within capital, and therefore when labor is incorporated 
not as an external but as an internal force, proper to capital itself.”(Hardt and 
Negri 2003, 224) 
Hardt and Negri argue that Rawls’s theory constitutes an account of a political 
system in which the real subsumption of labour has been successful. That is to say 
Hardt and Negri believe Rawls describes a political system in which labour has been 
completely displaced. 
This system could be thought of as the antithesis of multitude: a political system 
that stems entirely from labour. It is useful then to focus on the interpretation Hardt 
and Negri present of Rawls’s theory to gain a sense of the system that constitutes 
the principal opposition of multitude. 
Hardt and Negri fundamentally associate Rawls with a mechanistic and procedural 
notion of politics. They suggest that in cleaving politics of labour, Rawls’s system 
attempts to displace social conflicts that would be capable of undermining the 
system. However, the conflict that emerges from inequality within society, and unfair 
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labour practices, are not resolved, just set aside. It is as a result of the procedural 
character of the system that this displacement can occur: “Rawls detemporalizes 
the ruptures of innovative and creative forces, and formalizes them in a hypothetical 
or ideal contractual procedure: a passage without crisis.”(Hardt and Negri 2003, 
220) 
However, they argue that Rawls’s theory has been superseded by that of Rorty, as 
an account on the displacement of labour by capital. They argue Rorty describes a 
system in which: “Questions of labour, production, gender difference, racial 
difference, sexual orientation, desire, value and so forth are discarded because they 
are personal affairs thus matters of indifference for politics.”(Hardt and Negri 2003, 
236) 
Hardt and Negri suggest this disinterested political system is given an almost 
unstoppable momentum by excluding these social issues from politics. For 
instance, once a group of public utilities have been privatized, a tendency for further 
privatizations within the public sector emerges. 
This augmentation of the system is complemented by what might be described as a 
stilted process of political change. That is to say although certain progressive 
initiatives can gain ground in the short term, ultimately society returns to the same 
starting point.  
The arguments Hardt and Negri make on difference and imperial sovereignty 
provide good examples of this stilted process. To re-iterate their argument is that 
difference appears at first to be tolerated, but in fact, difference is only temporarily 
accepted. The conflict difference generates is never entirely resolved.  
Hardt and Negri take this argument a step further in Postmodern Law when they 
comment on the avoidance of difference in liberal systems: 
“The thin [liberal] state avoids such engagement: this is what characterizes 
its “liberal” politics. In effect, this line of argument extends the thin concept 
of state to a thin conception of politics. Politics, in other words, does not 
involve engaging and mediating conflicts and differences but merely 
avoiding them.”(Hardt and Negri 2003, 238)  
This quotation is typical of the position Hardt and Negri outline on thin state rhetoric 
within neo-liberalism. Hardt and Negri argue that despite claims to advocate a 
significantly smaller state the application of neo-liberalism has resulted in a vast 
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increase in the size of the state. More precisely, although the welfare state has been 
reduced, spending on the military has increased significantly. Hardt and Negri cite 
the policies of the Regan and Bush governments as examples of this trend. 
As a consequence of the increasing militancy of neo-liberal society, Hardt and Negri 
argue: “The police, even if it remains in the shadows and appears only in the final 
instance, is the lynchpin that guarantees the order of the postmodern liberal 
State.”(Hardt and Negri 2003, 239)  
The argument Hardt and Negri put forward here could indicate the separation 
Foucault makes between the police and liberal governmentalities is invalid because, 
according to Hardt and Negri, the “freedom” neo-liberalism advocates can only 
exist within the setting of a powerful police environment. However, as noted in the 
first chapter, Foucault does not draw an absolute dividing line between the police 
and liberal modes; rather, they are stages along a continuum. 
In relation to governmentality, the critique Hardt and Negri present on neo-liberalism 
may, despite their intentions, indicate that multitude could become subservient to 
neo-liberal practice. The major criticism Hardt and Negri cite against neo-liberalism 
is that it displaces labour from politics. However in deriving their own political 
system from labour, Hardt and Negri approach politics from an economic 
standpoint, like liberalism and the police state. Hence, their political system is not 
capable of entirely displacing neo-liberalism or the police state. 
There is another aspect to the critique on neo-liberalism Hardt and Negri present in 
Postmodern Law: that is the communitarian response. It is important to review their 
understanding of communitarianism because there is evidence within this analysis 
that indicates they have mistakenly attributed the recent expansion of the state to 
neo-liberalism. 
Once again, Hardt and Negri use A Theory of Justice as the basis of their analysis. 
The common characteristic of communitarian interpretations of Rawls, Hardt and 
Negri suggest, is a belief in strong communities and strong subjects. That is to say 
through developing a strong national identity, individuals will feel empowered as 
part of a community. Hardt and Negri argue that in assigning the state the 
responsibility of establishing a communal identity it becomes a moral agent. They 
attribute the moralisation of the state directly to neo-liberalism. The decision of neo-
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liberal governments to avoid political engagement, Hardt and Negri argue, forces 
the state to become a moral agent: 
“The intervention of the moral planner-state (or rather the moral welfare 
state) is the only way to avoid the catastrophe brought on by liberalism’s 
chaotic free-market approach to value; it is the only way to produce the 
stability necessary for the mass production of subjectivity for the 
development of a coherent community of values.”(Hardt and Negri 2003, 
225) 
Hardt and Negri thus go on to argue that essentially neo-liberalism and 
communitarianism are two sides of the same coin. They argue that the connection 
between neo-liberalism and communitarianism is apparent in the entry of a moral 
imperative into political discourse during the Reagan era: “The communitarians, 
then, envision a program that would finally make good on Reagan’s promise of a 
national moral community.”(Hardt and Negri 2003, 257) 
This paper argues that the association made between liberalism and moral agency 
is incorrect. Essentially, the position of this paper is that the connection Hardt and 
Negri establish between neo-liberalism and communitarianism is specious. As noted 
above, neo-liberalism tends to undermine national boundaries; instead emphasising 
the goal of achieving economic stability, through rigorous pursuit of self-interest. 
If anything, their observations on the communitarian interest in establishing a strong 
state in order to facilitate strong individual identities has greater resonance with 
Foucault’s analysis on the rise of civil society than his thoughts on liberalism. Like 
the interpretation of communitarianism Hardt and Negri propose, Foucault’s 
account of civil society emphasises the importance of establishing strong 
communities to maintain the current configuration of national sovereignty. 
Indeed, many of the issues Hardt and Negri raise against liberalism stem from 
deviations from liberal theory and the principles of the rule of law. For instance, the 
increase in the size of the military may be more an expression of a worrying rise in 
nationalism rather than the application of liberal theory. The fact that socialist 
theory, including that of Hardt and Negri, has not yet been able to propose an 
alternative to the, albeit imperfectly applied, system of the rule of law suggests 
fundamentally Hardt and Negri have not advanced socialist thought to the point 
where it can offer an entirely autonomous alternative to neo-liberalism. 
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4 The Economic Rationale of Multitude 
The issue of civil society reveals an important, albeit somewhat problematic, 
relationship between Foucault's theory and that of Hardt and Negri. The theme of 
this chapter, biopolitics, establishes a more direct connection. 
The concept of biopolitical production is a central issue within the theory of 
multitude combining elements from the work of Foucault and Marx. Biopolitical 
production is based on a particular concept of labour that Hardt and Negri derive 
from Foucault's concept of biopolitics and some esoteric sections of Marx’s 
Grundrisse. They draw from Foucault's theory the division between biopolitics and 
biopower. However, they offer a different interpretation of the nature of this division. 
Hardt and Negri associate biopower with control and exploitation, while they see 
biopolitics as a representation of the multitude's creativity. This gives biopolitics a 
virtuous quality in the theory of Hardt and Negri, a quality that it is altogether lacking 
in Foucault's theory. 
Further, Hardt and Negri, like Foucault, believe that politics is never autonomous 
from power. However, they have deviated from Foucault’s position in that, for Hardt 
and Negri, all political structures emerge from labour. Whereas, the relationship 
between labour and politics would constitute just one expression of power within 
Foucault’s framework13. 
In relation to Marx, Hardt and Negri follow a tradition that emphasises the existential 
aspect of Marx's theory: particularly Marx's analysis on labour as the fundamental 
human (species) behaviour. 
The emphasis Hardt and Negri place on the role of labour within their interpretation 
of biopolitics is indicative of labour's role more broadly within their theory. 
Essentially, for Hardt and Negri all political systems emerge from labour14. This is a 
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13 Rabinow and Rose have written a useful, short summary on revisions of biopolitics by 
contemporary theorists. It does not explore these alterations in sufficient detail to warrant 
extended discussion in this paper (Rabinow and Rose 2009). Negri is among the theorists 
they examine, however, they suggest his insight is limited: “This [Negri’s] version of the 
concept of ‘biopower’ is emptied of its analytical force.” (Rabinow and Rose 2009). 
14 The emphasis Hardt and Negri place on labour as a source of politics has proved 
controversial. Fitzpatrick, for instance, has argued that labour performs a function 
comparable to the law in the theory of multitude (Fitzpatrick 2002).  In the absence of a 
strong legal theory, Fitzpatrick claims that the theory of multitude is ultimately too vague to 
constitute a complete political system. To a certain extent, this argument compares with the 
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crucial implication for how multitude relates to governmentality, and thereby, 
modern socialism's stance in relation to governmentality. 
In connecting politics so explicitly with labour, Hardt and Negri establish an 
economic rationale for their theory, which connects it to other forms of 
governmentality. This would have an advantage in that it may enable multitude to 
exist under the constraints of current politics. However, this paper will argue that 
there is a risk that multitude's economic rationale could be usurped by neo-
liberalism. 
Consequently, multitude may not offer the radical new political system Hardt and 
Negri claim. However, that is not to say multitude has nothing innovative to offer, it 
presents a significant new way to conceive collective identity in an increasingly 
globalised world. Hence multitude may nevertheless qualitatively advance global 
politics. 
4.1 The Influence of Foucault 
Hardt and Negri have largely based their concept of biopolitics on Foucault’s 
account of it in the concluding chapter of The History of Sexuality, vol.1.  Hence it is 
important to review how the concept of biopolitics differs in the lecture from that of 
The History of Sexuality. The History of Sexuality was published several years before 
Foucault delivered the lectures. The account of biopolitics in the chapter differs in 
some important respects. Generally, Foucault provides a broader overview of 
biopolitics in this chapter. Indeed, the concept of biopolitics is not discussed in 
much detail within the lectures, however, it is in the background throughout. 
Within the chapter, Foucault makes an important distinction between biopower and 
biopolitics. Foucault characterises biopower as an ideology while biopolitics refers 
to political structures and mechanisms that emerge from the ideology. 
Hardt and Negri submit a different interpretation of the relationship. Where 
biopolitics seems to flow out of biopower in Foucault’s account, Hardt and Negri 
associate biopower with Empire and biopolitics with Multitude: 
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claim that has been made a number of times in this paper that multitude, as Hardt and Negri 
present it at least, is too vague a concept to offer an alternative to neo-liberalism. Hence, 
Fitzpatrick raises an important point, the development of a legal structure for multitude may 
indeed assist in enabling it to move from theory to practice. However, this is not a paper on 
legal theory, so the connection will not be considered in detail.  
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“Biopower stands above society, transcendent, as a sovereign authority and 
imposes order. Biopolitical production, in contrast, is immanent to society 
and creates social relationships and forms through collaborative forms of 
labour.”(Hardt and Negri 2005, 95) 
Thus, although they would recognise the danger implied in Foucault’s account of 
biopower, they would associate this threat with empire. In contrast, they see in 
biopolitics the potential for the multitude to establish itself as the principal political 
agent. They believe that if biopolitics were the tool of multitude, it would use it 
creatively. The multitude would use biopolitics to generate new identities rather than 
exploit people in the manner of empire. 
Another feature that serves to differentiate the chapter from the lectures is the 
analyses on the connection between biopolitics and governmentality. This 
connection is discussed in significantly more detail within the chapter. However, 
Foucault’s examination on biopolitics and governmentality within the chapter 
complements his analysis on sovereignty within the lectures. 
Biopolitics fundamentally alters the nature of sovereignty. Indeed, within the 
chapter, there is the sense that biopolitics is the force behind governmentality. 
Foucault traces the transformations of sovereignty over the span of centuries, just 
as he did within the lectures. Within the chapter, Foucault focused on the juridical 
aspects of sovereignty. In particular, he commented on two issues: first, how 
sovereignty can confer certain legal rights upon citizens, and the form through 
which sovereign power is asserted. These issues were touched on only briefly in the 
lectures. 
Historically, Foucault claimed sovereignty was only asserted in exceptional 
circumstances, when it became necessary for the sovereign to take the life of a 
subject. This would only occur on two occasions: when the sovereign’s existence 
was threatened directly by war, or if a subject broke the sovereign’s law (Foucault 
1991, 252).  
In modernity, sovereign power is no longer expressed in this fashion. Today, power 
is diffuse and ever-present. It is no longer apparent only in these exceptional 
seizures of life15. Now subjects’ lives are entirely subsumed by politics. As a 
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15 This is the starting point for Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Agamben 1998). 
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consequence of this, sovereignty has transformed. Properly speaking, there is no 
sovereign, in the classical sense at least, instead there is only government. 
Foucault’s account in the chapter indicates government necessarily displaces 
sovereignty because power is derived from a fundamentally different source. 
Foucault suggested the principal difference between government and sovereignty is 
that sovereignty focuses on the lives of subjects rather than their deaths: 
“The right which was formulated as the ‘power of life and death’ was in 
reality the right to take life or let live. (Author’s italics) 
Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, 
bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of 
life in order to suppress it.”(Foucault 1991, 259) 
This concentration of power is notably different from that of governmentality. As 
noted in the first section, governmentality results in the politicising of lives of 
subjects. This is most obvious in the police mode, were the basic rationale is to 
build a strong and healthy population in order to increase the state’s wealth. 
However, it is also present in the liberal governmentalities albeit more subtly. The 
paradigm for economic sustainability within liberalism, most overtly within neo-
liberalism, is nature. As far as possible, economic processes must resemble the 
character of natural entities. These entities are not individual organisms but larger 
elements such as the weather or tide. Hence liberalism has an even broader focus 
than the police mode: it is concerned with the entire life-process of a society rather 
than single individuals. 
This transition has a series of serious implications for the relationship between 
subjects and political authorities. 
Clearly the description of governmentality Foucault offers in the chapter has 
parallels with his account on the police state. The police-state focuses on ensuring 
the continued health and prosperity of its population. Hence, one implication of the 
transition to government has already been noted, it is possible that the state could 
descend into authoritarianism as a result of government. 
However, Foucault went further within the chapter, there he argued that the change 
in rationale had dramatic implications for war: 
“Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be 
defended: they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone, entire 
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populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name 
of life…”(Foucault 1991, 260) 
Consequently, with the emergence of governmentality genocide becomes a real 
possibility: 
“If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a 
recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and 
exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale 
phenomena of population.”(Foucault 1991, 260) 
Hence, the transition to purely administrative politics is far from benign. 
Reviewing Foucault's analysis on biopolitics and governmentality within The History 
of Sexuality is crucial for this discussion. Hardt and Negri have not considered 
sufficiently the issues Foucault raises in relation to administrative government. 
Indeed, although Hardt and Negri could not have been aware of this at the time of 
writing Empire, Foucault closely associated bioplotics/biopower with the emergence 
of capitalism: 
“This bio-power was, without question, an indispensible element in the 
development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without 
the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the 
adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic 
processes.”(Foucault 1991, 263) 
Since Hardt and Negri advocate biopolitics so enthusiastically, this may indicate 
that they have not fully considered the implications of the practical application of 
multitude. The danger is that multitude merely recapitulates liberalism’s focus on the 
life-process, meaning that the same extreme dangers for war and genocide are 
present within multitude. 
However, Foucault's concept of biopolitics is just one part of biopolitical production. 
To fully appreciate the concept it is also necessary to understand Marx’s influence. 
4.2 Influence of Marx 
The concept of biopolitical production is significantly influenced by Marx’s theories 
of labour. However, Hardt and Negri, for the most part, draw upon obscure 
passages from Marx. 
Hardt and Negri share with Marx the belief that labour is the fundamental human 
behaviour. The closing pages of Empire, in which Hardt and Negri adopt a strong 
eschatological tone, make clear the centrality of labour within their theory: 
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“Indeed, labor is the productive activity of a general intellect and general 
body outside measure. Labor appears simply as the power to act, which is at 
once singular and universal: singular insofar as labor has become the 
exclusive domain of the brain and body of the multitude: and universal 
insofar as the desire that the multitude expresses in the movement from the 
virtual to the possible is constantly constituted as a common thing.”(Hardt 
and Negri 2001, 358) 
This quotation gives an impression of how Hardt and Negri understand human 
nature. However, they also accept the more technical arguments made by Marx in 
relation to labour. For instance, Hardt and Negri endorse Marx's arguments that any 
attempt to assign a quantifiable value to labour is ultimately futile and that previous 
attempts to do so have favoured a ruling elite. 
Hardt and Negri have modified Marx’s theory in some important respects: most 
notably in their concept of immaterial labour. Yet, even in this instance, they are still 
embedded within a Marxist tradition, with their insights on immaterial labour 
stemming from the Grundrisse.  
This section will concentrate on tracing the influence of Marx on Hardt and Negri in 
respect to their theory of labour, as well as, how they have developed Marx's 
arguments in order to develop their own novel ideas. 
In contrast to the aspects of biopolitical production derived from Foucault, the 
elements with their origin in Marx follow quite closely the arguments Marx originally 
proposed. As a consequence of this multitude is imbued with the anticapitalist spirit 
of Marx’s work. This point raises a problem for this paper. How can multitude be 
subject to a neo-liberal political system if it resists capitalism so absolutely? The 
answer to this question is that multitude’s economic rationale, a feature common to 
all forms of governmentality, is ultimately compatible with neo-liberalism. This point 
may not seem obvious, however, examining how Hardt and Negri have taken 
aspects of Marx’s theory and modified them for their own purposes makes apparent 
the compatibility. 
Beginning with how Marx's concepts of labour and value influenced Hardt and 
Negri, Hardt and Negri accept Marx's stance that within capitalist societies labour 
and value become increasingly abstract. This abstraction of labour is a complex 
process. An effective account of labour’s abstraction can be found in Alienated 
Labour. In this essay Marx provides a thorough account of the relationship between 
the worker and capitalist. Although this text is one of the early, unpublished, Paris 
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Manuscripts, it offers an excellent summary of the process. This abstraction of 
labour is a recurring theme across the whole of Marx’s work, there are even 
references to it in the more esoteric sections of Capital. 
The relationship Marx described between the worker and capitalist is rooted in his 
thoughts on the nature of labour. Marx argued that in creating any object through 
labour, an individual’s labour is objectified(Marx 2004). This means that any labour 
activity involves some abstraction of labour from the creator. Hence, there is always 
a gap between an object and its creator. In itself the objectification of labour is not 
problematic for Marx. His concerns emerged from how the objectification of labour 
was transformed by the relationship between the capitalist and worker. He felt the 
process of abstraction was taken a step further under this relationship, changing 
objectification into alienation.  
The process of alienation has several phases. It begins with the capitalist 
appropriating the worker’s labour. This is possible because the capitalist controls 
the means of production and so dictates the terms according to which workers 
make a living. This situation means that workers have no control over their standard 
of living.  
Hence according to Marx working conditions will continually decline as exploitation 
intensifies. It is worth noting here that Marx was writing at a particularly low point in 
working standards, meaning the situation has change significantly from his day. 
However, aside from the terrible physical conditions Marx felt capitalism had 
brought to workers, he was equally if not more, concerned by the psychological 
impact of capitalism.  
Marx characterised this psychological dimension of capitalist exploitation as 
alienation. That is to say, for Marx, capitalism results in a degradation of the worker 
that amounts to a loss of his humanity. Sayers offers an excellent summary of the 
importance Marx assigns to labour as the fundamental human activity: 
“Through this process we establish a relation to the natural world and to our 
own natural desires that is mediated through work. We objectify ourselves in 
our product, and come to recognize our powers and abilities, embodied in 
the world. We develop as reflective, self-conscious beings.”(Sayers 2007, 
433) 
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For Marx the defining characteristic of human beings, against animals, is that 
humans can work to produce objects for reasons aside from survival. Humans can 
work for aesthetic and creative reasons, rather than just out of instinct: 
“Therefore when alienated labour tears from man the object of his 
production, it also tears from him his species-life, the real objectivity of his 
species and turns the advantage he has over animals into a disadvantage in 
that his inorganic body, nature, is torn from him.”(Marx 2004, 91) 
Hardt and Negri would endorse this characterisation of capitalism. However, they 
believe that capitalist production has advanced significantly from Marx’s day, 
consequently, Marx’s theory of alienation must be revised. Hardt and Negri see the 
labour process itself becoming increasingly abstract. The next section will comment 
in more detail on this abstract, “immaterial labour”, which Hardt and Negri believe is 
the fundamental site of capitalist exploitation today. However, there is a further 
dimension to the influence of Marx’s concept of alienated labour upon Hardt and 
Negri16. 
With Capital, Marx advanced his notion of alienated labour a step further by 
examining two practical implications of the alienation of labour: the monetary 
system and wages. 
The monetary system, according to Marx, is pure abstraction. It was established, 
Marx claimed, in order to enable qualitatively different commodities to be valued 
quantitatively against one another. For Marx this system detracts from the true value 
of commodities because the value system is skewed to favour one section of 
society, the bourgeoisie, over the rest.  
The great strength of these passages of Capital, is that Marx disrupts entrenched 
notions of value to the extent that his critique is still relevant today. It is taken for 
granted that a particular product has a greater or lesser monetary value against 
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16 Hardt and Negri have commented on labour, value and alienation directly in a pair of 
companion essays, written individually, for the boundaries 2 journal (Hardt 1999) (Negri 
1999). These essays engage directly with the concepts, however they are not reviewed in 
this paper because they were written several years before Empire’s publication and make no 
reference to multitude. Even at this stage, however, the sense of an entity such as multitude, 
confounding the influence of capitalist forces, is apparent, especially in Negri’s essay: 
 
“The more the measure of value becomes ineffectual, the more the value of labor-power 
becomes determinant in production; the more political economy masks the value of labour 
power; the more the value of labor-power is extended and intervenes in a global terrain, a 
biopolitical terrain.” (Negri 1999, 79) 
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others: everyone seems to have some intuitive understanding of how the market 
operates. For Marx, however, the market value of a commodity is not a reflection of 
its true value. 
The problem Marx has with the market is that value is derived from exchange rather 
than labour: 
“When these proportions have, by custom, attained a certain stability, they 
appear to result from the nature of the products, so that, for instance, one 
ton of iron and two ounces of gold appear as naturally to be of equal value 
as a pound of gold and a pound of iron in spite of their different physical and 
chemical qualities…These quantities [of value] vary continually, 
independently of the will, foresight and action of producers.”(Marx 1999, 
45/6) 
It is unsurprising then that markets collapse on occasions because they are 
ultimately not founded on any true source of value. 
The establishment of wages is another example of an attempt to quantify labour. 
This particular abstraction involves first ignoring the qualitative differences between 
different forms of labour. Labour is then organised into a hierarchy, in which certain 
forms of labour are deemed more socially valid than others(Marx 1999, 15). 
As a consequence of the establishment of wages, the individual qualitative 
differences between workers are ignored. Gradually it becomes assumed that the 
labour of one individual is interchangeable with that of another. Indeed, it is 
essential that qualitative differences are negated. If labour is to be measured 
quantitatively, there must be an abstract notion of how long it takes “the average 
man” to do a certain task: 
“The total labour-power of society, which is embodied in the sum total of the 
values of all commodities produced by that society, counts here as one 
homogenous mass of human labour-power, composed though it be of 
innumerable individual units.”(Marx 1999, 16) 
Hardt and Negri share Marx's derision for attempts to quantify labour. However, as 
in the case of alienation, they believe the situation has changed from Marx’s time. 
Today, Hardt and Negri argue, this quantification is disrupted by biopolitical 
production: 
“…biopolitical production is on the one hand immeasurable because it 
cannot be quantified in fixed units of time, and, on the other hand, always 
excessive with respect to the value that capital can extract from it because 
capital can never capture all of life.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 146) 
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Hardt and Negri have not, however, addressed the problem of standardisation that 
Foucault raised in his analysis of socialism versus neo-liberalism. Marx, Hardt and 
Negri may be correct in their shared assertion that capitalism tends to undermine 
the qualitative differences between labour and the products of labour, but it is 
questionable if socialist regimes have done much better. Indeed, on the basis of 
current evidence, their record would seem to be much worse. 
However, this may be to dismiss the contribution Hardt and Negri have made to 
socialist theory too quickly. Clearly Hardt and Negri believed that their notion of 
immaterial labour had something new to offer. Hence the final section of this 
chapter will evaluate the role of immaterial labour in the theory of Hardt and Negri. 
4.3 Immaterial Labour and Technological Advance 
Immaterial labour is central to the theory of multitude and empire because it is 
through the emergence of immaterial labour that Hardt and Negri believe capitalist 
exploitation of labour will be ultimately undermined. It is closely tied to the concept 
of biopolitical production in that both share an expansive, unquantifiable notion of 
labour17. 
The concept of immaterial labour not only draws on the theory of Marx but also the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari. This paper will use Thoburn's critique on immaterial 
labour in order to outline the core features of the concept. In particular, Thoburn 
provides an effective reading of how Negri integrates aspects of the Grundrisse and 
the theory of Deleuze and Guattari on “minor peoples”.  Thoburn's critique on Hardt 
and Negri indicates that even this novel idea of immaterial labour is not sufficient for 
Hardt and Negri to avoid replicating the deficiencies of neo-liberal theory. This is 
because multitude relies upon an economic rationale, like all forms of 
governmentality, meaning that the possibility of multitude becoming an element 
within a neo-liberal system, or descending into authoritarianism, cannot be 
excluded. 
Thoburn raises three important issues for this enquiry: 
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17 This division between material and immaterial labour has been questioned. Sayers, for 
instance, argues: “Just as all “immaterial” labor necessarily involves material activity, so 
conversely all material labor is “immaterial” in the sense that it alters not only the material 
worked upon but also subjectivity and social relations. There is no clear distinction between 
material and immaterial in this respect." (Sayers 2007, 448) 
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i. The role of technology and general intellect. 
ii. The transition from the formal to the real subsumption of labour 
iii. The political role of a “small people”(Thoburn 2001, 82) 
 
Beginning with the first point then, Thoburn argues that Hardt and Negri derive their 
faith in technology from Marx, specifically the “Fragment on Machines” passage 
from the Grundrisse(Thoburn 2001, 80-85). Like Marx, Hardt and Negri believe that 
progressive advances in industrial technology will inevitably lead to a decline in the 
amount of labour expended in the manufacture of commodities. In the short term, 
capitalists will benefit from not passing on the gains accrued through the 
diminishing value of labour, but ultimately, labour will become worthless. At this 
point the entire value system of capitalism will implode because, if labour has no 
value, then there is no site for capitalism to exploit. This will grant people more time 
to pursue their own intellectual interests; meaning that work will be conducted for 
pleasure rather than out of economic necessity:  
“An explosive ‘contradiction’ arises because capitalism continues to 
measure these forces in terms of (increasingly unproductive) labour and 
labour time, and the possibility emerges of the valuation and creation of life 
based on the needs of the ‘social individual’ and ‘free time’.”(Thoburn 2001, 
82)18 
Turning to Hardt and Negri, this conviction that technology will transform labour 
clearly permeates the theory of immaterial labour. 
Hardt and Negri share with Marx the belief that the quantifying of labour in capitalist 
societies leads to exploitation. However, they note that the nature of labour has 
fundamentally altered since Marx’s day: that labour is becoming increasingly 
immaterial. This leads Hardt and Negri to expand the rather speculative arguments 
in the “Fragment on Machines” in several directions. 
First they characterise immaterial labour as hegemonic. By hegemonic they do not 
mean that the majority of people in the world are engaged in immaterial labour, 
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18 Labour-time describes one way in which capitalism quantifies and exploits labour. 
Essentially the creation of any commodity requires a certain amount of time on average. 
Advances in technology reduce the average amount of time required to create commodities. 
If the capitalist chooses not to pass on the savings made through technological advance, 
then he gains a surplus value. He can do this because he controls the means of production. 
The point then Hardt and Negri make with immaterial labour, in brief, is that technology will 
eventually become so advanced that no labour is required to create commodities, or if some 
labour is required it is of such a different quality than traditional labour that it cannot be 
exploited. 
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rather that all labour is becoming increasingly immaterial. They suggest the situation 
is analogous to that in the nineteenth century, when industrial labour replaced 
agriculture as the hegemonic form. To begin with only a minority of the work-force 
were engaged in industrial labour, but, over time, industrial labour became the 
dominant labour form(Hardt and Negri 2005). There are a number of implications of 
this transition to immaterial labour. 
For Marx, the proletariat was the only class capable of initiating the revolution 
because they alone bore the exploitation of capitalism. Hardt and Negri argue that, 
with the develop of immaterial labour, everyone across the world is potentially 
engaged in labour. Even in leisure they suggest people are engaged in labour. As a 
consequence, Hardt and Negri reject the classic Marxist notion that the proletariat 
will initiate the revolution because they believe everyone today engages in 
immaterial labour and so faces capitalist exploition. Hence, the revolutionary identity 
is, for Hardt and Negri, much looser that it is for orthodox Marxism. 
The second area of the “Fragment on Machines” that appears to have had 
significant influence on Hardt and Negri is Marx’s analysis on “general intellect”. 
This idea informs their notion of “the common”, which Hardt and Negri introduced in 
Empire and discussed in greater detail in Multitude. However, Thoburn’s analysis 
reveals some contradictions between Marx’s stance on general intellect and that of 
Hardt and Negri. 
For instance, although the idea of general intellect parallels that of the common, 
Thoburn’s text indicates that there is a critical difference. Where the common is 
associated with the multitude, general intellect is associated with capital. 
General intellect is the other side to the process of technological advance. Labour-
time can only be reduced because machines become increasingly sophisticated and 
capable of replicating the work of highly skilled artisans. Marx refers to this 
accumulation of skills in machines as “general intellect”. 
On the one hand Marx, like Hardt and Negri, recognizes that there is tremendous 
potential for liberation in the increasing sophistication of technology: “[Marx] posits 
communism not on a militarization of work, or an unalienated work, but on the 
destruction of the category of work enabled through complex mechanical processes 
and a life of expansive creativity, art and science beyond the drudgery of repetitive 
manual labour, or, indeed, work at all.”(Thoburn 2001, 83) 
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However, Thoburn’s analysis shows that Marx was deeply concerned that the 
continual advance of industrial technology would not necessarily precipitate 
liberation for the working class. The problem Thoburn suggests Marx observed was 
that advances in industry had only served to make labour consist of less complex 
activities, in turn reducing the skills required of workers(Thoburn 2001, 82). Hence 
qualitative differences between workers became increasingly incidental. Advances 
in technology then had not fundamentally altered the nature of work: “…work is not 
emptied of content, but filled with different content.”(Thoburn 2001, 84) 
More than that in fact, there is the potential for alienation of labour to become more 
intense. 
In order to appreciate why alienation could intensify as technology advances, it is 
useful to compare Marx’s analysis on general intellect with the concept of the 
“common”. The two ideas broadly share a notion that the labour of each individual 
is objectified and accumulated into a body of universal knowledge: 
“The real wealth, which is an end in itself, resides in the common; it is the 
sum of the pleasures, desires, capacities, and needs we all share. The 
common wealth is the real and proper object of production.”(Hardt and Negri 
2005, 149) 
The difference between Marx’s understanding of technology and that of Hardt and 
Negri is that Marx saw that knowledge embodied within machines could be re-
appropriated by capitalism. Rather than enhancing workers’ lives, Marx was 
concerned that technology could debase their work further by reducing the skill their 
jobs required. This could in turn lead work to become even more arduous and 
reduce the qualitative differences between workers.  
Whereas, Hardt and Negri, interpret technological advance, almost exclusively, in a 
positive light. They see any exploitation of the common as only temporary. The 
nature of the common, according to Hardt and Negri, means that it will ultimately 
shatter any attempt to quantify it. 
It is perhaps the combination of biopolitics and labour that enables Hardt and Negri 
to develop this largely positive notion of general intellect: 
“Labour and value have become biopolitical in the sense that living labour 
and producing tend to be indistinguishable. Insofar as life tends to be 
completely invested by acts of production and reproduction, social life itself 
becomes a productive machine.”(Hardt and Negri 2005, 148) 
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The argument here is that production becomes so connected with life that alienation 
is impossible.  
However, Thoburn’s argument shows that for Marx, technological advance was just 
one part of the liberation of the proletariat. If the assumption Hardt and Negri make 
regarding technology proved to be wrong, this is one area through which neo-
liberalism could encroach upon multitude. 
Having said that Hardt and Negri combine their analysis on technology and the 
general intellect with their notion of biopolitical production. It is thus necessary to 
examine the role of biopolitical production to determine if multitude would be 
capable of refuting neo-liberalism. 
4.4 Biopolitical Production as an Economic Rationale 
This final section will attempt to demonstrate that biopolitical production is the 
multitude’s economic rationality. Hence, like other forms of governmentality, for 
multitude politics fundamentally emerges from an economic rationale. This 
economic rationale then is the ground for neo-liberal practice to impinge upon a 
political system founded upon the ideology of multitude. 
This is no doubt a conclusion that Hardt and Negri would resist because they are 
convinced that the establishment of biopolitical production will undermine all 
attempts to quantify labour : 
“…biopolitical production is on the one hand immeasurable because it 
cannot be quantified in fixed units of time, and, on the other hand, always 
excessive with respect to the value that can be extracted from it because 
capital can never capture all of life.”(Hardt and Negri 2001, 148) 
In combining labour and biopolitics, Hardt and Negri establish an economic basis 
for politics that in some crucial aspects parallels elements of the relationship 
between economics and politics in neo-liberalism. This may require a re-evaluation 
of certain elements of the theory of empire and multitude. 
Essentially the theory Hardt and Negri propose shares with neo-liberalism the notion 
that the economy is the driving agent of civilization. That is not to say that these two 
theories can be reduced to the same simple concept. The point is rather that there 
are some significant areas of overlap between the two approaches. Consequently, 
although the establishment of the multitude could substantially improve global 
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politics, it may not offer the radical alternative to neo-liberalism Hardt and Negri 
suggest. 
For instance, an integral element within the concept of multitude is a conviction to 
freedom of movement. This position is ultimately compatible with neo-liberalism. 
The establishment of tight national boundaries keeps the workforce of states across 
the world artificially low, thereby impairing economic advance. Thus, there remains 
the possibility that multitude could become a checking mechanism particularly to an 
intensely globalised economy. 
Indeed, Thoburn’s analysis on the limitations of multitude complements the 
argument that there is some continuity between neo-liberal theory and multitude. He 
suggests that Negri has not followed through Deleuze’s thought on minor people 
and capitalism. Thoburn suggests that Negri has expanded the breadth of the 
concept of a minor people too far in the notion of multitude: 
“…whilst the minor is premised on cramped impossible minority positions 
where social forces constrain movement, Negri suggests that the 
minoritarian contributed to a new ‘concept of the majority’ of the 
autonomous multitude.”(Thoburn 2001, 89) 
Thus for Thoburn the concept of the multitude is too expansive. Further, Thoburn is 
also critical of Negri’s optimism regarding communication and the establishment of 
new identities: “He [Deleuze] suggest that instant communication is less 
concomitant with communism than with the intricate feedback mechanisms of the 
open spaces of control…”(Thoburn 2001, 89) 
Although Thoburn might not put it in such stark terms, his basic point is that Negri 
has distorted Deleuze’s argument by replicating elements of capitalist society. That 
is to say Thoburn suggests multitude is not radical enough to displace capitalism. It 
may be argued that Thoburn has overlooked the more positive attributes of 
multitude, that it offers novel ways to conceptualise political identities, however, he 
does raise a valid point. There are aspects of the theory of multitude that are 
compatible with capitalism, most notably biopolitical production.  
Biopolitical production shares with neo-liberalism a large-scale focus, a species 
view, of humanity. Further, biopolitical production is driven purely labour. 
Fundamentally neo-liberalism, as Hardt and Negri would accept, is driven by labour. 
The difference is only in how the labour of the system is organised and 
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accumulated. Hence it is not guaranteed that if multitude where put into practice, it 
would entirely displace neo-liberalism. 
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Methods of Conceptualising Political Change 
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At one point in Empire Hardt and Negri survey how European thought has 
traditionally approached criticising established political systems and devising 
alternatives(Hardt and Negri 2001, 181-190). On the whole, they are dissatisfied with 
the ambition and scope of imagination. They feel that European thought has yet to 
devise a critical strategy capable of resolving entirely the flaws associated with 
established systems.  
The lectures are historical surveys meaning that Foucault did not propose any 
specific critical strategy within them. However, in his short essay What is 
Enlightenment?, which was first published some years after his death, Foucault 
tackled the subject of how seeking and implementing change within politics could 
be approached. 
This final section will compare the critical strategy proposed by Hardt and Negri 
against Foucault's reflections in What is Enlightenment? There is one topic in which 
the differences between the two approaches crystallise: both approaches examine 
the European tradition through the paradigm of an inside/outside dichotomy. 
However, the conclusions drawn by the authors regarding the value of this 
dichotomy are opposed. 
This is an apt topic on which to end this discussion. Underlying this exploration on 
governmentality, and its relationship to socialism, has been an interest to determine 
if it is possible, and indeed desirable, for an alternative to the liberal and police 
traditions to emerge. Comparing these two critical strategies indicates that the best 
way to proceed may prove to be a cautious, piecemeal, approach. 
Hardt and Negri contend that the tradition in European political thought has been to 
conceive the flawed existing structures as an "inside" and imagine an alternative 
utopia as an "outside". They find this exercise to be self-defeating because the 
imagined alternative is conditioned by existing circumstances: "In all these cases 
the critique of modernity is situated within the historical evolution of forms of power, 
an inside that searches for an outside."(Hardt and Negri 2001, 185) 
Hardt and Negri believe it is imperative for political analysis to become more 
creative, to not be bound by convention in any way: 
"The power of the modern critique of modernity resides precisely where the 
blackmail of bourgeois realism is refused - in other words, where utopian 
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thought, going beyond the pressures of homology that always limit it to what 
already exists, is given a new constituent form."(Hardt and Negri 2001, 185) 
They include Foucault in this summary of the European tradition. They claim that 
Foucault falls largely inline with political thought since the Enlightenment, albeit that 
he inverted the inside/outside dichotomy: 
"In the end, Foucault's philosophical critique of the Enlightenment returns to 
the same Enlightenment standpoint. In this ebb and flow between inside and 
outside, the critique of modernity does not finally go beyond its terms and 
limits, but rather stands poised on its boundaries."(Hardt and Negri 2001, 
184) 
Hardt and Negri are correct to suggest Foucault adopts a position on the borderline 
of convention. However, they do not consider at any length why Foucault chose to 
adopt this perspective. Evaluating Foucault's reasoning reveals a significant 
weakness in the critical method proposed by Hardt and Negri. More positively, 
however, Foucault's analysis also indicates how the concept of multitude could be 
revised in order to make it more likely to achieve the kind of goals Hardt and Negri 
envisage. 
Foucault's method is more intricate than Hardt and Negri recognise. Indeed, the 
critical strategy Foucault outlined in What is Enlightenment? is certainly more subtle 
than that presented by Hardt and Negri.  
Bruns provides an effective summary of Foucault's approach. In his essay, 
Foucault's Modernism, Bruns traces parallels between Foucault's theory and 
philosophical notions associated with the modernist movement: in particular, Bruns 
compares Foucault's work with that of Baudelaire and Mallarmé. Foucault's work 
follows such modernist tropes as a fascination with discourse and the subject.  
The inside/outside dichotomy was also an important idea within modernism in 
general. The reading of Foucault Bruns presents reveals an understanding of this 
dichotomy different from that put forward by Hardt and Negri.  
Although there is a certain connection between the strategy proposed by Foucault 
and that of Hardt and Negri, in that both approaches challenge the conventional 
inside/outside dichotomy, the nature of the challenges put to the dichotomy are 
distinct. 
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Foucault, following modernist reasoning, emphasised the role of the outside, 
arguing that the subject (inside) is conditioned to a significant extent by the external 
milieu. Bruns describes this aspect of Foucault's thought as pure exteriority: 
"Pure exteriority means: an outside not correlated with an inside, not the 
object of a subject, but instead an outside that cannot be objectified, fixed or 
determined and so held in place or at bay."(Bruns 2005, 357) 
That is not to say Foucault adopted a determinist view of human nature. In his 
thought, human-beings are conditioned by their environment, but the conditioning is 
not absolute. Consequently, the role of discourse in modernism is comparable with 
Foucault's thought: "Discourse is not transcendent, that is, it is not outside the order 
of things, but neither is it altogether containable within it. Discourse is never fully 
digestible."(Bruns 2005, 359) 
Over time regimes evolve and change, further individuals act and react in numerous 
different ways. Hence it is impossible to say for sure that the environment 
determines individuals, or for that matter, that individuals determine the 
environment. As a consequence of this complexity, Bruns suggests that Foucault's 
work calls for a reevaluation of the subject, that it should be regarded as, "an 
impersonal refractory subject without an interior, a subject turned inside out."(Bruns 
2005, 352) Ultimately then: "The idea is rather to conceptualise subjectivity in a new 
way - to frame the subject without recourse to the canonical concepts of cognition, 
self-identity and rational control."(Bruns 2005, 369) 
Hardt and Negri challenge the inside/outside dichotomy on different grounds. As 
mentioned above, they felt that focusing on the outside had resulted in a lack of 
imagination within political thought. However, they went as far as to contest the 
notion that any external order could exist after modernity. Hence, they challenge the 
dichotomy from almost the opposite viewpoint of Foucault: 
"In the passage from modern to post-modern and from imperial to Empire 
there is progressively less distinction between inside and outside... The 
process of modernization, in all these varied contexts, is the internalization of 
the outside that is, the civilisation of nature."(Hardt and Negri 2001, 187) 
For Hardt and Negri the distinction between inside and outside has been displaced 
with the internal engulfing the external. Hardt and Negri do not show the same 
interest in subjectivity as Foucault, they see the encroachment of the inside on the 
outside as an encroachment of the private onto the public: "The public spaces of 
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modern society, which constitute the place of liberal politics, tend to disappear in 
the postmodern world."(Hardt and Negri 2001, 188) 
Hardt and Negri argue that this privatisation of public space precipitates a decline in 
public culture. They suggest different communities have dwindling opportunity to 
meet, which serves to strengthen boundaries between peoples. As evidence of this 
trend, they cite urban planning in cities such as Los Angeles and São Paolo, which 
they feel have created ghettos, thereby further entrenching class and ethnic 
stereotypes. 
The difference then in the critiques on the inside/outside dichotomy lies to a 
significant extent in the scope. Hardt and Negri devise a critique that emphasises 
public values. They believe theorist must be creative and unrestricted in their visions 
of a new politics. Foucault's critical approach works on a smaller scale, emphasising 
the individual's role in criticising and challenging conventions. 
That is not to say Foucault found the present situation acceptable. Rather it is 
argued here that Foucault had a greater awareness of the challenge involved in 
establishing a new politics under today’s circumstance than Hardt and Negri, as 
well as of the potential hazards involved in undertaking such an action. In his 
account on the role of political theory in Foucault’s writing, Simons presents an 
effective summary of what Foucault felt was at stake: 
“Our present political ethics is irreparably scientific, establishing fast bonds 
between power, truth and ethics, the three axes of Foucault’s genealogy. If 
there is no available scope for an alternative ethics, there is none for an 
alternative subjectivity. The axes of our subjectivity are so tightly entangled 
that the possibilities we are limited to are not enabling boundaries but 
constraining confinements.”(J. Simons 1995, 46) 
In some respects, this concern regarding boundaries compares with the imperative 
to redefine what constitutes a boundary within the theory of multitude. The major 
difference is the method applied to challenge such social boundaries. 
It is the view of this paper that Foucault's approach is ultimately more likely to yield 
successful results. There is a danger that the overly ambitious approach advocated 
by Hardt and Negri could lead to the hijacking of their idealism by more radical 
groups, who could use the imagined ends to justify profoundly illiberal means to get 
there. 
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This is precisely the aspect of What is Enlightenment? that Hardt and Negri missed 
in their reading on Foucault. Foucault's analysis indicates that the kind of grand 
visions of change Hardt and Negri advocate have dangerous precedents in 
European history. The implementation of such radical ideals has traditionally had 
disastrous consequences: 
“…we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of 
contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another 
society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the 
world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.”(Foucault 
1991, 46) 
Foucault has in mind here the radical ideologies of totalitarianism, which were based 
on the principle that human civilisation could be transformed entirely, irrespective of 
the means employed to reach this goal.  
In contrast, Foucault claimed that the more limited and targeted agendas of groups 
such as the civil rights movement or women’s liberation have ultimately yielded 
greater qualitative improvement for the lot of their members: 
“I prefer even these partial transformations that have been made in the 
correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude to the programs for 
a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the 
twentieth century.”(Foucault 1991, 47) 
By enabling traditionally disempowered groups to participate in politics these 
movements have improved society as a whole. They have broken down arbitrary 
divisions that prevented people from entering the workforce or politics. All without 
attempting to fundamentally alter human nature. 
Another important dimension to Foucault's strategy, which Hardt and Negri did not 
comment upon, is that the strategy is situated at the individual level. Foucault's 
theory indicates that individuals have an ethical obligation to reflect on and question 
their limits: 
“We have to move beyond the inside-outside alternative; we have to be at 
the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon 
limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge 
has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question 
today has to be turned back into a positive one… The point in brief, is to 
transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a 
political critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.”(Foucault 
1991, 45)  
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In contrast to Kant, who sought to define the limits of reason, Foucault argues that 
the critical process is unending. Reason’s limits must be constantly challenged, 
which will precipitate a gradual shift in dominant ideas, and eventually initiate 
institutional and political change. An important feature of Foucault's strategy then, 
apparent within the quotation above, is that there is no definite objective, there is 
only continual reassessment and testing of limits. Hardt and Negri on the other hand 
describe a clear trajectory from the rupture in authority in the middle ages, to 
imperial sovereignty and multitude. Foucault's account indicates that it is this 
assuredness in their ideals that may lead the theory of multitude to be usurped by 
agents with less benign intentions than Hardt and Negri. 
Up to this point this discussion has not considered how these critical strategies for 
political change relate to the concept of governmentality. This is an important topic 
to consider because appreciating the connection between Foucault's analysis on 
methods for critique and governmentality indicates how the concept of multitude 
could be modified, thereby making it more likely to succeed. 
Lemke, in revealing how Foucault's lectures challenge conventional criticism of neo-
liberalism, provides an effective way to bring governmentality into this analysis on 
methods. 
Lemke believed that the majority of critiques on neo-liberalism have been beset by a 
fundamental failure in method. He noted that often these analyses are characterised 
by a tendency to dismiss neo-liberalism and mistakenly claim to offer liberating 
alternatives. Lemke argued that these two factors result in such commentaries, 
counter-intuitively, reemphasising the structural flaws that led to the establishment 
of the problems associated with neo-liberalism in the first place. Hence he called 
for:  
"[A] “strategical” conception of theory [that] prevent[s] us from a very serious 
flaw that dominates much contemporary critique: the “essentialisation of the 
critique of essentialism”. What do I mean by this? When social and political 
scientists increasingly claim the importance of categories like “invention”, 
“fiction” and “construction” for their work, they often double the theoretical 
attitude they initially set out to criticise: By firmly believing the 
“poststructuralist” or “anti-essentialist” stance they adopt does signal a 
“right” or “true” knowledge, they actually take up a theoretical position, 
Foucault once criticized as ‘juridico-political discourse’.”(Lemke 2000, 14) 
In relation to the theory of multitude, Lemke's analysis indicates that the emphasis 
Hardt and Negri place on the creativity and radical quality of their theory may be a 
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sign that their theory will not challenge convention to the extent they believe. In fact 
multitude could prove to be one aspect of a more deeply entrenched neo-liberal 
hegemony. 
The wider point that emerges from Lemke's account is that there is a danger in 
establishing a new “liberated” politics simply by opposing it to a seemingly defunct 
rival. His analysis suggests that such an approach will not resolve governmental 
systems’ core imperfections. Indeed, it was noted above that there is exactly such a 
connection existing between neo-liberalism and multitude, through the economic 
rationales associated with both forms. 
Since the theories proposed by Hardt and Negri have never been put into practice, it 
is impossible to assert that this will definitely occur. Having said that, as Foucault 
argued, it is necessary to constantly question the limits of convention, and multitude 
offers a powerful way to do this. Following the strategy Foucault proposed in What 
is Enlightenment? indicates how multitude can be put into practice, while minimising 
its potential dangers. 
Foucault's account suggests that there are two fundamental problems with 
multitude. First, the extent of the change Hardt and Negri expect through its 
implementation; second is their belief, which informs the theory of multitude 
significantly, that progress is achieved by moving society through a series of 
political configurations. 
For Foucault "progress" does not mean following a predefined path. Rather it is 
more haphazard and, potentially, unending. The following quotation gives an 
impression of how Foucault regarded modernity more as a struggle to maintain 
progress that had been made already, than as a simple project with clearly defined 
steps towards an obvious end: 
“I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than 
as a period of history... And consequently, rather than seeking to distinguish 
the ‘modern era’ from the ‘premodern’ or ‘postmodern,’ I think rather it 
would be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever 
since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of 
‘countermondernity’.”(Foucault 1991, 39) 
Within the lectures, there is also the sense that history is not strictly sequential: 
“… we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty 
by a society of discipline, and then say, of government. In fact we have a 
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triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has 
population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential 
mechanisms.”(Foucault 1991, 107/8) 
Any change in a social system then is not necessarily permanent, it may become 
hegemonic, but ultimately it only adds to existing forms and will inevitably be 
superseded by future configurations. Any progress achieved is fleeting, and can 
only be sustained through permanent vigilance. The danger in the method Hardt and 
Negri employ is that it assumes there is an end-point. This is problematic. There is 
an assumption that complete political liberation is possible, such an argument on 
liberation has been used as a justification by many regimes to enact draconian 
measures. Further assuming there is an end-point could result in an attitude of 
complacency, that may allow space for the undermining of any progress made. 
Perhaps then, we should see multitude as another element in the mix of 
governmentalities existing today. It may not completely displace the other forms, 
but it may nevertheless significantly alter the present situation. It could, for instance, 
undermine conventional attitudes to nationalism, thereby undermine cultural racism 
and break down arbitrary conventions that prevent migration and hinder freedom of 
movement.  
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Conclusion 
This paper began by examining the core elements of governmentality and how the 
concept relates to socialism. It then proceeded to consider how governmentality 
relates to the theory of multitude, a particularly important development in 
contemporary socialist theory. Finally, this paper sought to evaluate the viability of 
multitude as a political system by examining it against Foucault's analysis on history 
and progress within the lectures and What is Enlightenment? Thereby determining if 
this branch of socialist thought had in fact established a socialist governmentality. 
Ultimately, the conclusion of this paper is that multitude does not constitute a 
unique socialist governmentality, nor is it likely to successfully operate as a political 
system without modification. 
The reason why multitude does not offer a unique socialist governmentality lies in 
the fact that it, like all forms of governmentality, relies upon an economic rationale. 
This rationale is different from that of other governmentalities in that it is derived 
from a concept of labour. Consequently, it would be unfair to suggest that multitude 
amounts to either liberalism or authoritarianism, as Foucault claimed of socialist 
theory in general. However, there is not sufficient reason to believe that if multitude 
were put into practice it would be substantive enough to stand against neo-
liberalism. 
The objectives Hardt and Negri propose are not entirely incompatible with neo-
liberal theory. The undermining of national borders and the imperative to enable free 
circulation of people, are also goals of neo-liberalism, which would require both 
elements to allow a truly global free market to develop. 
However multitude is not reducible to neo-liberalism. The economic rationale behind 
multitude is derived from a series of unorthodox ideas with their origins in the 
Grundrisse and Foucault's concept of biopolitics. The concepts of immaterial labour 
and biopolitical production are based on these sources. 
Hardt and Negri believe that technology has advanced to such an extent that 
labour-time becomes irrelevant, meaning that capitalist exploitation can no longer 
occur. They see immaterial labour and biopolitics as forming the basis for a new 
political system that will unleash the creative potential of the multitude.  
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A significant problem then with the theory of multitude is the expectations Hardt and 
Negri associate with it. They believe that it can radically alter modern politics. This 
paper argues that it cannot achieve such a transformation because its economic 
rationale is too close to that of the dominant governmentality, neo-liberalism. 
Further, there is a more fundamental issue concerning the critical method employed 
by Hardt and Negri. 
As Foucault illustrated in What is Enlightenment? there is a danger that such 
idealism can be exploited by malicious regimes. Indeed adopting the more cautious, 
gradual approach, of challenging the limitations of established reasoning may make 
it more likely that the objectives Hardt and Negri outlined in Empire and Multitude 
are achieved. 
The value of multitude lies in its capacity to offer a novel way to conceive collective 
social identities, particularly in an increasingly globalised political environment. The 
concept challenges nationalism and cultural racism. Hardt and Negri have also been 
instrumental in the revival of Marxist studies. 
There remain a number of questions that this paper will leave for future studies to 
consider. For one thing, there are many different branches of contemporary Marxist 
theory aside from Hardt and Negri. Hence investigations into how governmentality 
relates to the theory of such authors as Gramsci, Bourdieu and Wallerstein may be 
of interest. Further, more could be written on whether it is desirable for socialism to 
adopt governmentality or if it should seek to establish political structures on the 
basis of some alternative ideology. 
For the moment then, while Hardt and Negri have certainly not developed a unique 
socialist governmentality, there are still many potential benefits within their theory. 
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E,(3,(=!>(+?'-0+24!,;!^+(('0,2$!@-'00)!SGGO.!
d.!B#>,)(5!<$%&-+3#')!^"=!6$-?$-3!>(+?'-0+24!@-'00)!SGGA.!
d.!E98:,:91(*$[&)$&.1$Q(#"')&'C$,.$:A($?-($"4$B#>,)(5!E,(3,(=!@'(#F+()!SGGT.!
6$-32)!^+ND$'1)!$(3!"(2,(+,!K'#-+.!X@,02%,3'-(!E$I!$(3!2D'!e+2D'-+(#!,;!<+?+1!
:,N+'24.X!](!3&J")$"4$Q,".C<9<*$?$=),:,Z9($"4$:A($%:&:(G;")#)!&4!^+ND$'1!6$-32!$(3!
"(2,(+,!K'#-+)!SAV7TV.!E,(3,(=!>(+?'-0+24!,;!^+(('0,2$!@-'00)!SGGO.!
6$4'L)!Z-+'3-+ND!".!@A($=".<:,:9:,".$"4$3,J():C5!E,(3,(=!8,F21'3#'!l!W'#$(!@$F1)!
ABMG.!
d.!@A($7"&1$:"$%()41"#5!E,(3,(=!8,F21'3#')!SGGA.!
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E$N1$F)!U-('02,.!X<$(!]%%$('(N'!U_Y1$+(!:,N+$1!:2-F##1'0`X!](!B#>,)(O<$F(0$
=8":A(<*$7(&1,.-$!&)1:$&.1$F(-),)!'3+2'3!&4!@$F1!".!@$00$?$(2!$(3!Q,3+!5'$()!SA7
OA.!E,(3,(=!8,F21'3#')!SGGb.!
E$;;'4)!^$-L)!$(3!QF22$!e'13'0.!X8'Y-'0'(2+(#!2D'!](2'-($2+,($1=!:,?'-'+#(24!
$;2'-!^,3'-(+24.X!](!B#>,)(O<$F(0$=8":A(<*$7(&1,.-$!&)1:$&.1$F(-),)!'3+2'3!&4!
@$F1!".!@$00$?$(2!$(3!Q,3+!5'$()!ASA7AbS.!E,(3,(=!8,F21'3#')!SGGb.!
E'%L')!/D,%$0.!XZ,FN$F12)!*,?'-(%'(2$1+24)!$(3!<-+2+cF'.X!7(:A,.N,.-$E&)H,<#5!
"%D'-02=!>(+?'-0+24!,;!"%D'-02)!SGGG.!
^$-_)!W$-1.!X"1+'($2'3!E$&,F-.X!](!\&)8$E&)H*$%(8(':(1$[),:,.-<)!&4!W$-1!^$-_)!
'3+2'3!&4!5$?+3!^NE'11$()!CT7BT.!J_;,-3=!J_;,-3!>(+?'-0+24!@-'00)!SGGb.!
d.!=&>,:&8*$?$F(0$?J),1-)#(.:5!/-$(01$2'3!&4!:$%F'1!^,,-'!$(3!U3I$-3!
"?'1+(#.!E,(3,(=!J_;,-3)!ABBB.!
^$-_)!W$-1.!X^$ND+('-4)!"F2,%$2+,()!Z-''!/+%'!$(3!<,%%F(+0%.X!](!\&)8$E&)H*$
%(8(':(1$[),:,.-<)!'3+2'3!&4!5$?+3!^NE'11$()!bGT7bSS.!J_;,-3=!J_;,-3!>(+?'-0+24!
@-'00)!SGGG.!
^+0'0)!EF3I+#!k,(.! 9#&.$?':,".*$?$@)(&:,<($".$B'"."#,'<5!E,(3,(=!e+11+$%!
6,3#'!$(3!<,%Y$(4)!ABbB.!
d.!%"',&8,<#*$?.$B'"."#,'$&.1$%"',""-,'&8$?.&8C<,<5!/-$(01$2'3!&4!Q.!W$D$('.!
E,(3,(=!Q,($2D$(!<$Y')!ABOM.!
^,,-')!5$?+3.!XK',1+&'-$1!#1,&$1+0$2+,(!$(3!2D'!2-+Y1'!N-+0+0!,;!a%,3'-(+0$2+,(a!+(!
";-+N$=!R+%&$&I')!2D'!5'%,N-$2+N!8'YF&1+N!,;!2D'!<,(#,!$(3!:,F2D!";-+N$.X!@A,)1$
[")81$]9&):()8C!SS)!(,.!M![SGGA\=!BGB7BSB.!
^,00)!Q'-'%4)!'3.!@A($3&:()$;"9'&98:5!E,(3,(=!:$#')!ABBC.!
^F-YD4)!/+%,2D4!:.!XJ(2,1,#4)!5'N,(02-FN2+,(!$(3!U%Y+-'.X!7(:A,.N,.-$E&)H,<#)!
SGGA=!AM7SO.!
K'#-+)!"(2,(+,.!Xk$1F'!$(3!";;'N2.X!J"9.1&)C$Y!SM)!(,.!S![ABBB\=!VV7CC.!
K'+10,()!H-'22.!X@,2'(9$!KF3$`!:,?'-'+#(24)!H+,Y,1+2+N0)!<$Y+2$1+0%!.X!
=".:)(:(#><!T![5'N'%'&'-!SGGb\=!MO7VC.!
K,9+NL)!8,&'-2.!?.&)'ACK$%:&:(K$&.1$^:">,&5!E,(3,(=!H1$NLI'11)!SGGO.!
J0&,-(')!/D,%$0.!X:'NF-+24!$(3!?+2$1+24=!3-$+(0)!1+&'-$1+0%!$(3!Y,I'-!+(!2D'!
(+('2''(2D!N'(2F-4.X!](!;"9'&98:$&.1$/"8,:,'&8$7(&<".)!'3+2'3!&4!"(3-'I!H$--4)!
/D,%$0!J0&,-('!$(3!K+L,1$0!8,0')!CC7ASS.!E,(3,(=!8,F21'3#')!SGGT.!
8$&+(,I)!@$F1)!$(3!K+L,1$0!8,0'.!X/D,F#D20!,(!2D'!<,(N'Y2!,;!H+,Y,1+2+N0!
/,3$4.X!JN2,&'-!AS)!SGGO.!
D22Y0=mmIII.10'.$N.FLmN,11'N2+,(0m0,N+,1,#4mY3;m8$&+(,I$(38,0'7
H+,Y,I'-/,3$4GO.Y3;![$NN'00'3!Z'&-F$-4!AB)!SGGB\.!
! 96!
8,00+)!>#,!5.!n6jEo('!5'0&-,F00'0)!>#,!@,F1+.!X/D'!<,F(2'-7U%Y+-'!2,!<,%'!,;!
2D'!5+0N,F-0'!,;!2D'!*-'$2!8+?$1=!"(!"22'%Y2'3!5'N,3+(#!,;!^+ND$'1!6$-32a0!$(3!
/,(+!K'#-+a0!U%Y+-'.X!%',(.'($&.1$%"',(:C!MB)!(,.!S!["Y-+1!SGGT\=!ABA7SAV.!
:$4'-0)!:'$(.!X/D'!<,(N'Y2!,;!E$&,F-=!^$-_!$(3!D+0!<-+2+N0.X!%',(.'($&.1$%"',(:C!
VA)!(,.!b![SGGV\=!bOA7bTb.!
:NDF%Y'2'-)!Q,0'YD!".!=&>,:&8,<#K$%"',&8,<#$&.1$Q(#"')&'C5!K'I!i,-L=!
6$-Y'-<,11+(0)!SGGC.!
:+%,(0)!6'(-4.!B'"."#,'$/"8,'C$4")$&$;)(($%"',(:C5!<D+N$#,=!>(+?'-0+24!,;!<D+N$#,!
@-'00)!ABbC.!
:+%,(0)!Q,(.!;"9'&98:$&.1$:A($/"8,:,'&85!E,(3,(=!8,F21'3#')!ABBT.!
/D,&F-()!K+ND,1$0.!X"F2,(,%,F0!@-,3FN2+,(`=!J(!K'#-+a0!pK'I!:4(2D'0+0a.X!
@A(")CK$=98:9)($I$%"',(:C!AC)!(,.!T![SGGA\=!VT7BM.!
/,0N$(,)!"1&'-2,.!?80&C<$?8)(&1C$6.8C$F"0*$F(-),$&.1$:A($2,">"8,:,'&85!k,1.!S)!+(!
@A($/A,8"<">AC$"4$?.:".,"$F(-),*$7(+"89:,".$,.$@A(")C)!'3+2'3!&4!/+%,2D4!:.!
^F-YD4!$(3!"&3F17!W$-+%!^F02$YD$)!AGB7ASC.!E,(3,(=!@1F2,!@-'00)!SGGV.!
 
